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Introduction 
Publishing Brands and Digitization: Strategic Issues 
and Key Variables.  
 
Abstract 
 
This paper moves from the economic issues raised by digitization and by the roll-out of 
an innovative support such as Reading Tablets on Press Magazine’s market. The switch 
from a “physical analogic model” to a “digitized model”, by separating the concepts of 
meaningful expression from the support allowing for publishing, imposes a rethinking 
of media industries’ business models. Tablets may accelerate the switch, allowing for 
new versioning and bundling possibilities and increasing the willingness to pay for 
digitized media expressions. Starting from this set up, the paper analyzes the key 
economic issues emerging for magazine publishers facing digitization, both at the firm 
level and at the industry level, where new strategic interactions may occur, changing the 
traditional dynamics in the value chain.  
Coping with digitization involves establishing new vertical relations and dealing with 
the multiplication of coordination issues on the distribution side. The paper identifies 
the economic issues emerging in this context for different types of brand with different 
business models. The objective is to show that efficiently exploiting the enhanced 
discrimination opportunities and emerging network externalities is a very complex issue 
for a publisher, especially during the start-up phase of a new distribution channel.  
 
Keywords: media economics, digitized media, publishing, pricing, copyright, two-sided 
markets, multi-channel distribution. 
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Introduction 
 
What would be the optimal bundling and pricing strategy of a magazine publisher if the 
digitized market keeps growing in double digits? Under what product-market conditions 
(market share, “switching” and marketing costs) would be more profitable to offer a 
specific digital version of a magazine? Would digitization “kill” the traditional 
distribution channels (through cannibalization, piracy, etc.)? After a decade during 
which magazines brands have gone on-line on free or freemium models, new versions 
are emerging through smartphones and tablet devices. These versions can be offered on 
paying models, which might be more beneficial to publishers. At the same time, the 
introduction on the market of a substitute media, with the same meaning but with 
different economic characteristics and distribution channels, raises important strategic 
questions for publishers. The objective of this paper is to discuss these questions, 
exploring the key economic issues and trade-offs faced by a magazine Publisher under 
different digital scenarios.  
The economic issues raised by digitization of information goods have been largely 
studied by economists. Digitization (Shapiro 1998) of copyrighted goods have had a 
growing impact on Media industries since it allows for a much cheaper and faster 
circulation of contents, the drawback being the increase of transaction’s costs, 
cannibalization of traditional industries and the creation of new challenges for legal 
institutions such as massive piracy and Creative Commons. Varian, H. (1995) 
introduces the problem of pricing goods with heterogeneous evaluations and a cost 
structure with high fixed costs – or costs of the first copy – and negligible marginal 
costs. He shows how engaging in price discrimination and bundling techniques in these 
cases lead to a situation in which both the industry and consumers are better off. By 
differentiating the product the market can be segmented and revenues can be recovered 
also from user with low willingness to pay without destroying the value from segments 
of consumers with high-willingness. Deneckere and McAfee (1994) show that even the 
conscious use of product degradation can make all parties strictly better off under 
specific circumstances. In addition to differentiation, bundling is a price discrimination 
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technique which is particularly important when dealing with information goods and 
experience goods (Nelson 1970), since a utility evaluation can be made only after the 
consumption of the good and the heterogeneity in evaluations can be important. 
Bundling consist in offering distinct products for sale as one package. Nalebuff, B. 
(1999) shows how this tool is effective in auto-sorting consumers into different groups 
according to their willingness to pay. Bundling is effective, under specific 
circumstances, even if products are partial substitutes, as it is in the case of thematic 
channels in pay TV, or as it is likely to be the case with different versions of the same 
media
1
. The effectiveness of multi-form bundling (a package composed of the same 
product declined in physical and digitized versions) has been studied by Koukova, N., 
Kannan, P.K. and Ratchford, B. (2008). They show that complementarities exist 
between different formats and consumers tend to value them positively proportionally to 
the awareness they have about the differences between formats. Bakos and Brynjolfsson 
(2000) show that the optimal strategy for information goods (with low marginal cost) is 
pure bundling, while Venkatesh, R. and Chatterjee (2006) have analyzed the magazine 
markets the magazine market finding that it is always profit-enhancing for publishers to 
offer digitized versions although the domain of optimality of pure bundling is more 
limited. 
Despite all this contributions, Media companies are struggling to define their optimal 
marketing mixes in a context of increasing digitization. In the case of magazine 
publishing, the complexity of the profit maximization problem is increasing 
proportionally with the incertitude on digital scenario and the multiplication of versions 
and distribution channels. Each magazine has a characteristic utility function, 
embedding a number of characteristics and strategic choices, which needs to be adapted 
to each new version and to consumers’ revealed preferences. Traditionally publishers 
have adopted a trial by doing approach in which the strategy is adapted ex-post 
following the accumulation of experience. This approach, which has been successful in 
the paper model, may no longer be sufficient to keep competitiveness in a digitizing 
market. Not only the choice of marketing mix becomes more complicated for 
publishers, but new avenues for placing the products appear continuously involving new 
agents in the value chain. The creation of new vertical relations and the multiplication 
                                                             
1 See Gentzkow, M. (2005) on complementarities between physical and online newspapers 
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of products and distribution channels may reduce the efficacy of ex-post responsiveness 
to the market and may complicate the interpretation of data gathered from experience. 
The paper thus reconsiders the strategic decision-making process in the context of 
multi-form products under the current technological developments. We outline the 
economic implication of the basic available digital strategies, and we analyze which 
type of publishing firm could benefit more from a given digital strategy, through the 
identification of some common characteristics and key variables. Moreover, we show 
that no general differentiation or bundling strategy can be defined as optimal for the 
whole industry under current market conditions. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: the economics of a magazine 
publisher producing both paper and digitized versions is presented in the next section. 
The third section introduces the available strategies and the related economic issues. 
Section four concludes outline the results of the analysis and tackling some emerging 
policy issues. 
  
Digital Publishing: Market and Strategies   
 
Magazines are publishing (and distribution) platforms, bundling collections of articles 
subject to copyright, selected, edited and published on a regular schedule under a 
publishing brand. They are generally financed by advertising, by a purchase price and 
by pre-paid subscriptions. The utility of this good is composed by expressions of 
various kinds (texts, photos, covered by copyrights) gathered within articles under a 
publishing brand and coupled with a support allowing for its diffusion.  
Although generally included in the same industry, press magazine differs from news 
press for at least two crucial aspects: first of all, life-cycle, although short in both cases, 
is not the same for the two media. Magazines provide a different kind of information, 
enriched with in-depth elaboration. Moreover, magazines allow for more differentiation 
in term of formats, topics and prices, just to outline a few.  For almost a decade, while 
digitization was limited to PC, magazines’ publishers observed the evolution of the 
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digital market, perceiving it as an unprofitable niche and a limited treat, due to the low 
compatibility of digital supports with the exploitation of magazines’ utility. Innovations 
such as smartphones and tablets have accelerated digitization of written expression 
creating a new, more appealing market for publishers. Notably reading tablets, which 
are conceived as a dedicated support for written or generally visual contents, have 
substantially raised consumers’ utility from digital versions and allowed for more 
versioning and bundling opportunities. 
Digitization of press magazines relaxes traditional constraints of the industry such as 
space, copying and logistic issues. This additional flexibility provides more strategic 
options to publishers. This may enhance discrimination opportunities but complicates 
the strategic decision-making process. The model focuses on two strategic decisions for 
publishers, which are particularly relevant: 
1. Multiform marketing mix: digitization allows for the multiplication of 
versioning and bundling opportunities, complicating the strategic choice of the 
optimal marketing mix. 
2. Organization of the retailing network: digitization opens the possibility of 
directly distributing contents and extending direct interaction with consumers. 
This implies a rethinking of the distribution channels and the retailing network, 
considering cannibalization issues among alternative choices 
 
1. Multiform marketing mix 
 
While the free or freemium
2
 model of press websites has revealed not to be sufficiently 
profitable, mostly due to the redistribution of advertising revenues among medias, the 
potential development of paying digital versions represent an opportunity for media 
brands to seize. As shown in the graph below, digitized versions of magazines could 
reduce traditional marginal costs up to 40% of cover price. The tradeoff which needs to 
be calculated is whether these savings are sufficient to outweigh a number of emerging 
                                                             
2 A business model which allows a consumer to receive basic services for free, but requires them to pay for any service deemed to be premium. 
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costs upraising with digitization. In order to exploit the opportunities offered by the 
digital market, a publisher needs to produce an investment effort (production and 
marketing of digital versions) that varies depending on the selected versioning and 
distributing strategy. Moreover, cannibalization
3
 effects must be carefully evaluated 
since each digital strategy may impact the traditional business model. Cannibalization is 
critical: not only it may reduce sales but, more important, it deprives the physical 
channel from economies of scale which are crucial for the business model. The fewer 
copies are sold, the higher becomes the production and distribution costs, as well as the 
fixed costs allocated to each copy. Moreover, digitization will impact first the more 
rentable zones with high densities, which are already equipped with broadband. Finally, 
digitized distribution fees needs to be paid to online retailers as well, unless a publisher 
set up his own digital retailing network. Estimations of the rate of technology adoption 
(potential market) and magazine-specific digitized market share are crucial to determine 
the optimal digital strategy for a publisher.   
 
Fig.1: Impact of dematerialization on a magazine’s cost function 
 
The magazine market is structured as a monopolistic competition, in which each title 
has a share of the market including a base of loyal readers and a share of consumption 
                                                             
3 Cannibalization is the decreased demand for an existing product that occurs when its vendor releases a new and similar product. 
Magazine Cost Structure – Paper vs Digital Model*
VATCover
Price
MarginDiscount Production Transport Distribution Marketing
100% 40%
2% 13%
14%
13%
7%
40%
* Weekly magazine subscription, France
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by impulsion. The cost structure of a paper magazine includes important fixed costs – or 
costs of the first copy - related to editing and marketing. Marginal costs, related to 
quantity include mainly: cost of reproduction, logistics and distribution. Marginal costs 
accounts for 30% to 50% of the cover price. On the revenue side, publishing is a two-
sided market in which both consumers and advertisers contribute to the global revenues 
for roughly 50% each in mean.  
As said above, the introduction of digitized versions allows for more versioning and 
bundling opportunities. Digitized versions are substitute products of a paper magazine; 
nevertheless, different versions may have different degree of substitutability, due to 
their characteristics and the shape of consumers’ preferences. The table below resumes 
the characteristics, in terms of substitutability and revenues opportunities of the most 
common digitized versions. 
 
Version Revenues Substitutability 
Free website Only advertising Low due to format 
compatibility 
Premium website Subscription and 
advertising 
Low due to format 
compatibility 
PDF version on PC Cover price and advertising Medium 
PDF version on tablets Cover price and advertising High 
Smartphone app Cover price,  dynamic 
advertising 
Medium due to low 
comfort 
Tablet app Cover price,  dynamic 
advertising 
High 
Fig 2: Characteristics of Digitized Versions 
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Different versions can be combined, thanks to bundling techniques, to offer a marketing 
mix capable of discriminating efficiently. The most commonly offered bundles in 
publishing are: 
1. Bundle of editions (subscription): consumer pays ex-ante the consumption of 
a certain number of editions of the same magazine at a discounted price. This 
allows reducing the risk for the publisher and allows for a better planning of 
capital investments. Publishers often charge subscribers at marginal cost or even 
lower. The low profits are compensated by the larger per number income from 
advertising. 
2. Bundles of titles: one or more magazines are sold together with the main media 
as annexes. 
Digitization increases the bundling possibilities eliminating physical constraints to the 
dimensions of the bundles. Moreover, it introduces a new bundling option: 
3. Bundle of versions, allowing for multi-support consumption, basically 
unlimited access to magazines’ content in time and space. This may include 
access to contents on up to “four screens” (namely TV, PC, Tablet and 
Smartphone) plus the paper version. 
As in the case of versioning, each bundling strategy has different characteristics in term 
of profitability and emerging costs such as cannibalization. 
  
2. Organization of the retailing network 
 
Once a Publisher has decided to develop digital versions, he will have to establish a 
digital distribution strategy. He may decide to outsource distribution, in which case he 
will have to bargain with an independent agent to set a fee for this service. On the other 
hand he may choose to distribute directly through his own website. A digital distributor 
develops a digital offer and maximizes his profits. His profits are positively correlated 
with the quantity and quality (in terms of market share) of media available on his 
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platform. A digital distributor may exploit as well the available bundling strategies to 
create attractive offers and capture consumers’ surplus. The market of digital 
distribution is characterized by barriers to entry, due to high fixed costs to set up the 
platform and to exclusive licensing contracts with publishers. This risks configuring the 
digital distribution market as an oligopoly. Moreover, the objective of the digital 
distributors may be different from the objective of the publishers, introducing an agency 
problem if the distributor is not directly controlled. To analyze the trade-off between 
setting up a digital retailing network and outsourcing digital distribution providing 
licenses to third parties, a number of economic effects need to be observed. Consider a 
Publisher facing a strategic decision for the distribution of digitized versions. If we 
exclude, for simplicity, hybrid strategies, the publisher is left with two options:  
1. Licensing. Establish one or more contracts with digital distributors (same model 
as physical kiosks). This option implies lower investments (the only additional 
cost being eventually the implementation of specific reading applications for the 
different OS). Profits from selling would be reduced by a distributor fee which is 
usually calculated as a percentage of the cover price. 
2. Direct retailing. A publisher may decide to sell independently the digital 
version of his paper magazine on his own distribution platform. This strategy 
implies a progressive switch to a digital model with potentially high 
cannibalization of paper sales. It embeds higher margins since the marginal cost 
of a digital version are null. 
 
3. Advertising 
 
Profitability of press, both paper and digital, depends also on advertising revenues. The 
observed advertising revenues for publishers in the digital markets are slightly lower 
than the equivalent in the physical market. This aspect is crucial and is responsible for 
the uncontrolled increase in the failure rates in the industry worldwide. The gap between 
online and offline advertising is not justifiable with technical reasoning. On the 
contrary, online advertising presents a number of advantages with respect to traditional 
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advertising. Online allows for sophisticated targeting of the audience and increased 
traceability and measurability. Despite this good features and the steadily increasing 
share of the global advertising investment that is moving through the internet the 
revenues that traditional publishers make online are very low. This gap can be a 
consequence of two factors. On the one side, the freeriding on brand investment made 
by digital intermediaries such as ISP, search engines, social networks, etc. These agents 
convey the traffic on their website using copyrighted contents or proprietary brands 
creating a transfer of surplus from the owners of these rights to the owners of the 
infrastructures. This trend, which has been tacitly approved by the policymakers in 
order to favor the development of the network, is now under serious questioning and the 
recent agreements signed by Google in France and Germany are a clear sign that we 
will observe consistent changes in the near future. The second factor is the 
multiplication of the offer of contents in the digital market, which is diluting both the 
market shares and the time spent on the single content by the consumers. The evolution 
of the regulatory framework and of the gap in advertising revenues between the digital 
and the physical markets is crucial for the strategic decisions and for the sustainability 
of many firms in the publishing industry. It deserve an in depth analysis that we will 
further develop in a later paper.  
 
Bundling and Pricing Digitized Contents  
 
This section analyses what marketing mix would be optimal for a given magazine as a 
growing share of consumers gets access to the new Media, in the literary sense of the 
support allowing for the exploitation of digitized contents. We also try to identify the 
implications of different pricing strategies of digitized versions for publishing firms 
operating in both markets. In the case of magazines’ publishing, the firm’s asset can be 
represented as a portfolio of brands, identifying different magazines. Each paper 
magazine is associated with a share of the global market, which is the result of the 
utility of the single content and the immaterial investment in the brand. The physical 
market is traditionally characterized by a few big players with relevant shares of the 
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market (above 1%) and a multitude of niche players with lower shares. For each brand 
included in the Portfolio, the Publisher may have to select a digital strategy. 
 
 
Fig 3: Representation of paper market and identification of publisher’s portfolio 
 
1. Definition of new agents, variables and space of strategic 
decisions 
Excluding authors, we can simplify the emerging digital value chain to two rational 
agents: 
 A Publishing Brand p 
 A Digital Media Retailer r 
Assume that the publishing Brand produces and owns the property rights of a magazine 
which is available in two versions: Paper or Digital. p is the only possible producer of 
the magazine but there exist substitutable products in the market, although not perfect 
substitutes. On the other hand r is a retailer that owns a platform allowing for the 
distribution of magazines in digital versions. If p choses to distribute through r, it has to 
pay a distribution fee on each copy sold. The problem for p is to maximize his profit 
Market Share
N°Titles
   
   
   
T1 T2 T3
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function   , choosing the most suitable digital strategy and the appropriate pricing 
strategy for the different version of his magazine. Disregarding all the hybrid strategies, 
we can simplify the decision space of the publisher as follow: 
1. In the first stage p decides, given his strategy in the traditional market, 
whether to enter the digital market  
2. In the second stage, if she enters the digital market, the firm decides whether 
to distribute the digital versions directly or to outsource distribution to the 
retailer. 
3. In the last stage, if p distributes directly, he chooses the marketing strategy 
and prices. To simplify again, we will assume that the available marketing 
mixes are limited to three pure strategies: 
a. To sell the paper version and the digital version independently 
b. To sell exclusively a bundle including both the paper and the 
digital versions 
c. To sell both the paper version, the digital versions and the bundle 
To resume, the model produces five possible outcomes, as outlined in the graph below: 
 Strategy1 (   ): Not entering digital market and keep doing with business as 
usual 
 Strategy2 (  ): Outsourcing distribution of digital magazines through licensing 
to digital distributors 
 Strategy3 (   ): Setting up a direct distribution platform to sell the digital 
version of the proprietary magazine, a direct digital retailer. 
 Strategy4 (   ): Setting up a direct distribution platform but selling only the 
bundle composed of the paper and the digital versions of the magazine in a pure 
bundling strategy. 
 Strategy5 (   ): Setting up a direct distribution platform sell both the bundle 
and the digital version independently, in a mixed bundling strategy 
18 
 
 
 
Fig 4: Sketch of the strategic decisions faced by a publisher 
 
The above-mentioned strategies are likely to have different impacts on paper sales and 
on cost function. In fact, introducing a digital version of the same paper magazine is 
equivalent to introduce a substitute product in the market (at least partially) and will 
generate a cannibalization effect. Moreover, producing the digital version and setting up 
the digital distribution implies emerging costs. For example we can argue that every 
strategy introduces a cannibalization effect. This could be counter-intuitively at least for 
the non-entering strategy. We could think of at least three reasons to support this 
hypothesis. First of all, in order to access the digital version, a consumers need to be 
equipped with a specific device (costly). These consumers may be favorite magazine for 
a substitute if it is not available in digitized format. The second reason is that, as the 
digital market grows, the paper market is likely to keep a declining trend, which will 
impact sales on the traditional market. The third reason is the possibility of an increase 
of the costs in the traditional channel as the sector declines. As for the other strategies, 
licensing is likely to have the strongest impact on paper sales, since we are introducing 
in the market a substitute product and we are also introducing an agency problem since 
the distributor’s maximization problem disregards the effects of his strategy on the 
traditional value chain. On the other hand, a pure bundling strategy will have no impact 
Magazine 1
   
Digital 
Strategy
  
Disintermediation
Strategy
      
Magazine 2Publisher
Enter Do not enter
   
Disintermediate Licensing
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since the paper version is always included in the bundle. The other strategies will have a 
cannibalization effect ranging among these two extremes. The debate on the 
cannibalization effect of the internet channel has been very rich. While many 
economists agree on a strong negative covariance between digital and paper sales, some 
other have found evidence that this covariance is not perfectly negative and that some 
complementarities can emerge among different Media, although both digitized and 
traditional products contains the same content. For example, in their recent study 
Koukova et al. have shown that the negative correlation is not perfect and can be 
reduced increasing the awareness of different usage functions among different versions. 
As we said before, another issue can be represented by the fact that a publisher wishing 
to enter the digital market needs to invest in order to produce and promote his digital 
offers. Digital versions are commonly assumed to have zero marginal costs, but each 
strategy implies emerging extra fixed costs for the firm. We can assume that these costs 
will increase with the commitment in the digital market, and they are null if a firm does 
not enter the market or provides licenses to sell digital editions. As an example, setting 
up a direct retailing channel will be obviously more expansive than just setting up a 
digital format and then outsourcing distribution. 
 
2. Demand and maximization problem with multi-channel 
distribution 
 
The potential market consists of surplus-maximizing potential consumers who have 
heterogeneous evaluations of the magazine produced by p. The utility of the good for 
the consumer is revealed only after the purchase is made and the magazine has been 
examined. Moreover, consumers may have heterogeneous preferences for the format. 
Some of them may have a higher evaluation for the hardcopy for many reasons. They 
may value positively the marginal cost of the paper or they may like to keep the 
magazine for different reason. Some people even confess they like the smell of printed 
paper. On the other hand, a group of consumers may have a preference for the digitized 
versions, for example if they have invested in a specific digital reader. In such a context, 
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defining the maximization problem becomes far more complex for publishers than in 
the traditional market. In addition, the competitive environment and the regulatory 
framework of the two distributive channels may differ slightly. In the paper market, the 
publisher has a very good grasp of the dynamics of demand and of his competitors, he 
suffer limited piracy and free-riding, sometimes he pays less taxes and even receive 
public subsidies. On the other hand, in the digital market demand depends on totally 
new variables, the risk of piracy and free-riding is extremely high and taxation is 
usually higher for the same content, since in many countries a digitized magazine losses 
his status of cultural good and becomes an electronic good or even a service. 
The first issue that we have already introduced is that the demand for digitized version 
depends on the diffusion of digital supports among consumers, especially among 
consumers with a high evaluation for the magazine produced by p. The second issue is 
that the market share of a brand in the digital market does not seem to reflect the share 
of the market in the traditional market. Since the whole offer is available for browsing 
on the same support, important masses of consumers may move to a different site or 
application in a very limited time. Traditional brands need to adapt and understand what 
drives these movements. Setting up a comfortable interface and adapted formats for 
exploiting the digitized contents is just a first step. In many cases many key processes of 
the firm has to be revised. For example, in the news press, we have observed the shift 
from a prevailing paying model with discrete timeframe to a free model with continuous 
timeframe. Digital journalists now need to produce news in real time, with very limited 
editing possibility, to attract consumer masses on their platforms. Some brands are now 
trying to propose new models, but the competitive environment is very unfavorable 
since many brands keep offering their contents free of charge and the differentiation of 
products is very limited by the real-time constraint.   
Another issue for the publisher, if he decides to enter the digital market, is how to do it. 
In terms of cost there are two variables that need to be considered, both in the short and 
in the long term. On one side, the firm will be facing potentially high emerging fixed 
costs to produce and advertise the digital version. This investment should then be 
compensated by the savings on the marginal cost of production of digitized copies. On 
the other side, an effective control on the pace and amplitude of the shift to the digital 
market is crucial to manage the negative aspect of digitization. Investing more today to 
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keep the total control of the distribution through the set-up of a direct digital retail can 
prevent the firm from cannibalization and free-riding, but the competition with large 
digital retailers can become unsustainable in the long run. On the other hand, 
outsourcing distribution to a large retailer may increase the exposure of the brand and its 
diffusion in the short run, but in the long run, as the digital retailer increase his market 
power, may result in a transfer of surplus from the contents producers to the owners of 
the distribution network.  
 
3. Strategic guidelines for publishers facing digitization 
 
From the above discussion, it seems evident that there exists no unique optimal strategy 
for publishers facing digitization. The optimal strategy depends on the characteristics of 
the publisher, such as his market power in the traditional market and his capability of 
investing in the new market. In addition, it depends on the evolution of the digital 
market in term of size and regulatory framework.  
In this section we outline in details the key economic implication of each of the digital 
strategies that we have previously defined above. Each strategy provides different 
discrimination opportunities and risks for a publisher. The problem for the publisher is 
thus simplifies to the selection of the strategy that generates the highest output for the 
firm between the available strategies (pure bundling, mixed bundling, direct retailing) 
   
 
    ⌊                  ⌋ 
Let’s analyze these outputs. We start from the bottom of the graph in Fig. 4 and we 
proceed backward analyzing all the decisions. 
Strategy 3                                           
If the publisher decides to directly distribute digital versions, he needs to calibrate his 
investments and select a pricing strategy for the two versions. Beside the sum needed to 
set up and manage the digital retailer, the firm needs to establish a plan to advertise his 
own distribution platform at the same time taking in consideration the negative impacts 
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of cannibalization on the traditional retailing channel. One strategy could be to focus the 
strategy and the advertising campaign on enlightening different usage functions and 
complementarities within versions. Digitized version allow for more personalization, 
interactivity and for the addition of extra contents. Nevertheless, the introduction of 
digitized version sharing large chunks of the same content is likely to produce a 
cannibalization of the paper sales proportional to the diffusion of digital supports. As 
the digital market grows, the only variable that can drive this process is price. A 
common strategy in the industry has been to offer digitized contents at marginal cost 
(i.e. for free) on direct platforms. This strategy has not been effective for the hidden 
costs have not been calculated precisely by publishers. Offering digital versions for free, 
especially when the price of the hardcopy is positive, maximizes the shift of consumers 
to the digital market. If the model is based on the advertising revenues, to test the 
sustainability of the model the emerging advertising revenues should compensate not 
only for the investment made, but also for the direct and indirect losses in the traditional 
channel. Direct losses includes advertising and the margins lost on the share of paper 
sales that “gets cannibalized”, indirect costs could be the raise in marginal costs of 
production and distribution if the industry is subject to scale economies. The profit 
function of a firm offering the digital version for free can be represented with the 
extremely simplified expression:  
    [(        )  (      )    ]  [          ] 
Where the index   or   represent the paper or the digital version,   is the cover price,   
is the per copy advertising revenue,   is the marginal cost of production,   [   ] is 
the coefficient of cannibalization and     is the fixed cost. In order for the pricing 
strategy to be sustainable, we must have:  
    
    
  
 (        )  
Considering the condition for the digital market only, can lead to profit losses for the 
firm. 
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Notice that if cannibalization is maximal,    , the per copy advertising revenues of 
the digital version should be higher than the total net margin per copy in the paper 
market(        ). Th 
Strategy 4                              
A good option to mitigate this negative effect could be the use of bundling. Economists 
such as Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999), Jeon and Menicucci (2006) and Nalebuff 
(2004), have analyzed the beneficial effects of this option for firms as a discrimination 
tool and as an entry barrier. The originality here is that we are not bundling different 
products or components, but rather different access to the same set of information. We 
call this multiform bundling. Bundling may help reducing cannibalization and 
consumers’ heterogeneity in evaluations. On the other hand, the choice of a pure 
bundling strategy, which means selling only a bundle composed of both the paper and 
the digital formats of a magazine at a price which is lower than the sum of the two 
prices and is usually equal or higher than the higher of the two single prices, may imply 
an increase of marketing expenses in order to increase consumers’ awareness of the 
added value (different usage functions) of a multi-support offer, as outlined in Koukova, 
et al. (2008).  
An extreme pure bundling option that has been used frequently in publishing is to offer 
the digital versions for free to paper subscribers. This strategy allows for the total 
control of cannibalization and is a way of developing brand loyalty on the digital 
market. On the other hand, this strategy is costly for the publisher as the digital market 
does not produce any additional revenues, beside a potential expansion of the demand. 
In order to describe the profit associated to this strategy, we can write:  
    [(        )             ] 
Where the index   denotes the bundle. With respect to the previous strategy, the cost for 
the company can be written as: 
     (     )(        )  (     )        
Where         represent the increase in sales implied by the enhanced offer and 
     represent the eventual increase in advertising revenues as a consequence of 
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increased diffusion.      0 the strategy is profit enhancing for the publisher; 
otherwise it may still represent a possible initial digital strategy, since it allows a total 
control on the shift towards digital market. In addition, bundling reduces variance of 
consumers’ evaluations for the different versions and allows for auto selection, allowing 
for testing of digital pricing strategies with a lower risk.  
Strategy 5                              
The mixed bundling case is an intermediate strategy between strategy dr and strategy 
pb. The firm offers the paper and digital versions of the magazine as well as the bundle 
composed of both the versions. This strategy provides the publisher with a tool that can 
regulate the tradeoff between cannibalization and digital profits, better discriminating 
consumers with a high willingness to pay a specific version of the product. Since the 
optimal price of the paper version is already given when the digital strategy starts, by 
setting the price of the digital version and the bundle, the publisher can decide which 
objectives to pursue. Setting a higher price for the digital version or a lower price for the 
bundle will decrease cannibalization while increasing the price of the bundle and 
reducing the price of digital version will encourage the shift towards digital 
consumption.  Increasing both the price of the bundle will reduce the quantity and 
profits in the digital market, this strategy can be used to slow down the switch to the 
digital market of consumers with a high evaluation for both the physical and the digital 
versions. This solution can be particularly effective if the indirect organizational 
switching costs are high. On the other hand, reducing both the price of the bundle and of 
the digital version will increase the demand in the digital market and the cannibalization 
of paper sales. This strategy is effective either to promote digital offers or if the firm 
expects a growing profitability for digital versions, for example an increase in    or a 
favorable policy set by the government. 
For a given   
  Increasing      
  Decreasing      
  
Increasing      
  Economic impact: reducing 
total sales, slowing down 
digitization, reduced 
Economic impact: Increase 
digital sales and 
cannibalization 
25 
 
cannibalization 
Decreasing      
  Economic impact: 
increases digital sales and 
reduces cannibalization 
Economic impact: increases 
digital sales, accelerates 
digitization 
 
Fig 5: The effects of pricing in a mixed bundling strategy 
Having analyzed the output for the direct retailing strategies, we can move back one 
step on our decision space and analyze the tradeoffs that a publisher should consider 
before deciding whether to distribute digital versions or provide licenses to an external 
digital distribution.  
Strategy 2     – Outsourcing distribution through licensing 
As we said at the beginning of this chapter,   is a retailer selling digital versions of 
magazines. The retailer is already active in the digital market selling other magazines 
(or bundles of magazines). If   is given a license to distribute the good produced by  , 
he will gets the control on the marketing mix, namely he will decide whether to offer 
the good in a bundle or as a single product or both. In order to distribute the digital 
content,    demands a licensee fee, usually calculated as a percentage on the cover price 
of each copy sold. The key differences between this model and the direct retailing thus: 
1. Firm   does not need an initial investment to enter the digital market      , 
but her margin on the digital good is reduced to         
2. The publisher loses the direct control on distribution of her content. This has 
different economic implication.  
a. On the one side the distributor gets in contact with the final consumer 
and canalizes the traffic on his platform. Exploiting the brands in his 
portfolio    becomes the recipient of a share of advertising revenues in 
the digital market which is hardly quantifiable for the publishers.  
b. On the other side, the retailer objective function does not take in account 
the traditional channel and the retailer may try to put pressure on 
publisher to lower  the prices of their digital versions 
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Moreover, if allowed to do so, the digital distributor will always have an interest in 
bundling the contents on his platform since this strategy would by profit enhancing for 
him. In fact, as shown in the bundling literature such as Nalebuff (1999), Venkatesh & 
Chatterjee, (2006), by bundling non substitutable products with null marginal costs, the 
firm is always capable of increasing her profits, exploiting auto-selection of consumers 
and introducing barriers to entry by leveraging the exclusiveness of his offer. While this 
strategy is certainly beneficial for the distributor, it may impact negatively publisher’s 
profits. In fact, as seen in the previous section, lowering    increases digital sales but 
also the cannibalization effect on the traditional channel, with uncertain effects on the 
total profits of the firm.  
Intuitively, being included in a bundle will be more beneficial for small publishers, 
which will be able to leverage their digital sales and free-ride on the strong brands 
within the bundle. On the other hand, participate in this bundle will be less beneficial 
for products with a high share of the traditional market, since they will be used as 
flagships in the bundle and will generate positive externalities on niche magazines that 
they are hardly able to internalize. 
 
Fig 6: Externalities in an “all you can eat” type of offer 
A recent survey from crmmetrix supports this intuition on consumers’ behavior towards 
digital offers of the type known as “all you can eat” or “flat”: 75% of consumers’ will 
download magazines they would have never bought in paper version. Among this, 42% 
have discovered titles they didn’t know and are likely to keep downloading these new 
Title4     )
Downloads
N°Titles in 
the bundle
Bundle (n°)
Title3     )
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magazines in the future. Finally, about 18% of consumers who discovered new titles 
have then bought a paper copy in the following period. 
In order to mitigate this effect, strong publishing brands should establish very specific 
contracts with digital distributors, limiting their control on the marketing mix.  
Strategy 1                                     
Having analyzed the economic issues behind every possible digital strategy, we can 
now look at the first strategic decision faced by a publisher; whether to set up a digital 
offer or to keep doing business as usual in the traditional market. The issue here is to 
model the effect of the growth of digital media markets on the traditional markets. The 
observation of previous cases and the economic literature clearly shows a negative 
impact of the growing diffusion of bit-encoding techniques on traditional media 
markets. In the last decade, digital media are attracting higher shares of advertising 
budget and people are shifting the allocation of their leisure time from traditional to 
digital media. Moreover, innovations such as smartphones and tablets have increased 
this trend. People with a high degree of preference for the new support may be willing 
to change their consumption habits if they cannot find a given content on their preferred 
support. Summing up, a publisher who decides to keep doing business as usual trades an 
uncertain result on the digital market for a very probable reduction on their traditional 
business.  However, the strategy of limiting losses by not entering the digital market can 
be optimal for number of publishers with specific characteristics. A few examples: 
1. Local free press, which relies on local advertisers which may find more 
convenient to invest in a limited area than to use sophisticated internet 
techniques to reach their target audience.  
2. Magazines that target audiences with a very low preference for digital versions 
(i.e. third age press) 
3. Luxury magazines, using special types of paper and pictures that cannot be 
reproduced digitally. 
 
4. Regulatory framework and competitive environment 
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The last element that we need to analyze is the regulatory framework of the new market. 
As shown in the economic literature on multi-channel distribution and in this paper, 
when a new avenue of conducting business is set in parallel with the traditional 
distributive channel, two negative externalities are introduced in the business model: 
cannibalization and freeriding of immaterial investment. Non-homogeneous regulatory 
frameworks or competitive environments in the different retailing markets can increase 
the distortion in the market. In the case of digital publishing, we can identify two critical 
aspects related to heterogeneous or incomplete legislation 
1. Taxation issues (or the different taxation of the same content). 
The differential in gross profitability of physical and digitized versions, as we have 
seen, depends mainly on their different cost structures, on eventual distributor’s fees, on 
consumers’ preferences for formats and on differential in per copy advertising revenues. 
In order to calculate the net differential, we should add the differences in taxation, 
which can be observed in many countries. In fact, counter intuitively, the same content 
proposed in different versions can be subject to different regulations. In Italy and 
France, for example, a physical magazine benefits from the status of cultural good while 
a digitized copy of the same magazine is an electronic good, subject to regular taxation. 
We can write the net margin on paper copy as: 
(        )           
While the margin on a digitized copy reads:  
                      
We can use the differential in cover prices   
     
  
 and substitute in the above 
expression to obtain: 
(               )           
Setting the condition: 
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(        )  (      )  (               )           
We can calculate the differential in cover price that equalizes the profitability of the two 
versions: 
    
(        )  
(      )
        
   
       
 
This way we can appreciate the effect of non-homogeneous taxation on the price 
differential that equalizes profitability. In the case of homogeneous taxation we have 
that: 
    
(        )    
       
 
While in the extreme case of       , or        we have respectively that:  
     and   
  
       
 
This differential is a strategic variable that needs to be considered while setting a digital 
strategy. The figure below shows the economic impact of setting a certain price for a 
version. The choice of a given differential should be done accordingly with the strategic 
objective of the firm. Setting an incoherent differential could otherwise worsen the 
negative externalities or reduce the effectiveness of a digital strategy. 
Premium for paper version Difference in marginality per copy 
    
(        )  
(      )
        
   
       
 
Paper copy has higher net margin 
    
(        )  
(      )
        
   
       
 
Equal margin for paper and digitized 
version 
    
(        )  
(      )
        
   
       
 
Digitized copy has higher net margin 
Fig 7: The impact of taxation on net marginality of different versions 
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2. Policy issues (or the different regulation of the same content). 
Taxation is not the only distortion introduced by regulation in the publishing industry. 
There are two other policy aspects which need an attention in order to create a level 
playing field. The first aspect is the regulation about vertical agreements. The recent 
cases in the U.S. and E.U., where publishers have been investigated for the 
establishment of tacit vertical agreements with a major digital retailer have outlined the 
different treatment that physical and digital media goods are subject to. While physical 
books market historically benefited from vertical agreements in various forms, 
regulation of e-books market has been more favorable to digital retailers in the last 
decade. Still immaterial investments are common for books in both physical and digital 
forms. While some countries have tried to homogenize regulation extending special 
provisions from the physical to the digital segment of the same industry (the law PULN 
on minimum retailing price for e-book), some others don’t, generating more distortion 
between the two distributive systems.  
The second policy issue is the revision of Copyright law, which does not seem able to 
protect intellectual property under current market conditions and to cope with the 
separation of meaningful content from a physical support allowing for its distribution. 
This aspect is vital for the industry and a more in-depth analysis of the economic effects 
of possible emerging regulation is left to a following paper. Nevertheless, we observe 
that the difficulty of conjugating the regulation with the new emerging business models 
has not permitted to create a convincing new framework yet. On the contrary, digitized 
copyrighted works are suffering the more and more since the uncertainty on property 
rights is coupled with confusing interpretations of the exhaustion principle (digitized 
copyrighted works are often sold as licenses, while their physical homologues are 
exchanged as goods). The only strategy available for publishers is to team-up with the 
providers of access to media catalogues. Distributors of digitized media and 
manufacturer of reading devices found that a way to protect and reward IP is the 
creation of non-compatibles, proprietary standards and environments such as kindle 
from Amazon.com or iPad from Apple. They are thus promoting “walled gardens” as an 
efficient way for protecting and valuing copyrighted goods. This solution is suboptimal 
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with respect to an efficient copyright law and presents intrinsic risks for the preservation 
of diversity in cultural industries since it leaves the authority on the intellectual property 
rights in the hands of private firms.   
 
Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have analyzed the economic issues raised by the development of 
digitized versions of magazines and then we have discussed the main available digital 
strategies for a publisher facing the emergence of this new market. After a decade in 
which almost every publisher created a free website offering exclusive copyrighted 
contents, the appearance of tablets has increased the utility of digital magazines and 
stirred up the offer and the consumption of digitized versions. The originality of the 
problem is that digitization introduces a new avenue of conducting business 
reformatting the same meaningful contents through bit encoding techniques. While the 
products share the same set of information and are thus close substitutes, the cost 
structures, the distribution dynamics, the competitive environments and even the 
regulatory frameworks differ slightly from the traditional to the digital market. Finding 
the optimal strategy to exploit this new market, exploiting the potential of a multiform 
marketing mix without devaluing the traditional value chain is not an easy task for 
publisher. We have tried to provide the reader with all the elements that are needed to 
take strategic decisions while dealing with growing digitization, starting from the 
evidence that there exist no optimal strategy that can be adapted to all publishers and all 
strategic objectives. As an example, the relevant investments needed to implement a 
direct digital retailing strategy may not be compatible with a niche publisher, while a 
well renown publisher may be reluctant to outsource distribution, since a digital 
distributors’ may have an incentive to free-ride on her brand value to maximize profits. 
We have also discussed the strategic use of multiform bundling techniques to mitigate 
the negative externalities of multi-channel distribution with substitute products. By 
bundling different versions of a single brand and adjusting relative prices, a publisher 
can control the cannibalization effect on the traditional value chain and set her desired 
pace of growth for digital sales. Nevertheless, entering the digital market will not 
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necessarily be profitable for every publisher. In particular for some categories of 
magazines with specific local or social targets the optimal strategy may as well be not to 
enter the digital market at all, at least until the digital market will not be fully deployed. 
Furthermore, we have proposed a synthetic measure that allows calculating the price 
differentials that are compatible with the selected strategies with respect to objective 
parameters. Finally, we have discussed the main policy issues at stake and the effects 
they may have on a publisher’s choice of his optimal digital strategy. The whole cultural 
industry suffers from the heterogeneity of the regulatory frameworks and from the 
inefficiency of copyright law since the beginning of the digital era. Distributors of 
digitized media found that a way to protect and reward intellectual property is the 
creation of non-compatibles, proprietary standards. This system seems effective but the 
lack of regulation and the loss of control from the authorities   may result in a number of 
systematic risks in the long term.   
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Chapter 1 
Digital Media Economics: How bit-encoding 
techniques have changed the business? 
 
Abstract 
Media economics is undergoing a process of rethinking due to radical technology 
innovation on the support side. The originality of the problem is that digitization is quite 
not just a technologic innovation, improving efficiency through the value chain (search 
costs, copy costs, logistic costs, enhanced versioning, etc.), it is also a new written 
language. Bit encoding affects the meaning of copyrighted contents and their publishing 
protocols in many ways: unveiling model, creation of demand and resonance, 
temporality, appropriation and distribution of property rights, just to name a few. The 
study of these aspects is essential in order to fully understand the emerging economic 
models in media industries. In this paper we will explore some of the recent research 
efforts focusing on the effects of digitization and regulation on Media economics and in 
particular on the publishing industry. The main contribution of this analysis is that it 
tries to conjugate the economic literature that analyses technology related issues 
generated by digitization with contributions analysing the impacts of new publishing 
protocols, following a value-chain based approach. Economists will find in this article 
not only the more important contributions on pricing and bundling in digital two-sided 
markets or multi-channel distribution models, but also interesting contributions from 
other specialists, analysing questions related to regulatory framework and even 
epistemologic issues. The objective is to conjugate these contributions to provide 
researchers with a broader set of intuitions and a fresh approach. The main hypothesis is 
that fundamental questions such as: is an e-book a book or an electronic good and what 
will be the future competitive environment for a digital publisher, cannot be properly 
answered by focusing only on technical aspects of digitization. 
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Introduction 
 
Bit encoding techniques represent an unrivalled opportunity to promote a wider 
diffusion of cultural goods. They allow for diffusing messages, images, music and 
videos with negligible copying and transport costs, both for correspondence or for 
publishing purpose. In order to deploy the social benefits (positive externalities) of 
digitalization, access to this technology needs to be provided to consumers. The support 
allowing for exploitation of digitized media is composed by a device capable of 
decoding strings of bits and a network connecting sources and receivers of these strings. 
Given these characteristics, digitization cannot be regarded just as a technical 
innovation. It is a new avenue for communication composed by a new support or 
“medium” (the internet) and a new language (the 0,1 alphabet). The advent of this 
innovation has permanently changed the traditional paradigms of Media industry. 
Moreover, the impact of these changes on the media value-chain is growing 
exponentially with the deployment of enhanced networks (such as ADSL) and the 
penetration in the market of new digital supports (smartphones, e-readers, etc.).    
This article synthetize key contributions in different fields, related to the economic 
effects of digitization on media firms business models, with a value-chain based 
approach. The focus of the research is on the issues emerging for publishing firms that 
are active in the traditional media industries and approach the new avenues of 
conducting business offered by the internet channels. The originality of this problem is 
that it combines many fields of economics research: publishing is an example of a two-
sided market and the introduction of digitized versions configures a multi-channel 
distribution of substitutable products. Moreover, the originality of information goods 
cost structure and distribution allows for profit enhancing bundling strategies but 
threatens the immaterial investment that are critical in the context of experience goods 
subject to copyright. In order to organize all these important aspect, we use a value-
chain based approach, in which contributions are divided considering in which interface 
(i.e. interaction among agents) of the value chain they have an impact. Moreover, we 
consider two categories of effects for each interface: on the one side, the technologic 
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effects, defined as the changes generated by bit encoding techniques in the supply chain 
or in the industrial context. This include for example: gains in efficiency, reduction of 
transportation and production cost, new opportunities for price discrimination such as 
unlimited bundling or some drawbacks of online distribution such as increases in piracy 
and freeriding or cannibalization among competing distribution channels. On the other 
side, we address the effects of digitization which are related to the content of media 
goods, such as the creation of contents, their nature, their meaning, their publishing 
protocols and the distribution of property rights. These effects are slightly harder to 
analyse and to evaluate, since they affect the utility of media goods as well as 
customers’ preferences and willingness to pay both for the new goods and for the 
traditional ones. 
 
1.1. Overview of Research 
 
To provide a visual mapping of this research, we can build a two-dimension matrix in 
which on one axis we describe the supply chain of a media industry and on the other 
axis we set the two categories identified in the previous section. In its most 
parsimonious form, a supply chain in the Media industry consists of authors, editors, 
retailers and customers (consumers of media or advertisers) who manage the bi-
directional flows of goods, information and money. Digitization affects each interface in 
many ways. To simplify we try to regroup the effects occurring at each interface under 
one label, partially following the work of Cattani et al. 2005. We label the three 
columns corresponding to the interfaces in the supply chain as: procurement, 
distribution, and pricing. Regarding the lines of the matrix, we can label the categories 
of effects as technologic, if it does not affect the intrinsic characteristics of the goods or 
related to the publishing protocol if it does. We define publishing protocol as the set of 
transformations which are necessary in order to transform some meaningful expression 
in a media good. It is composed of different steps, the most important of which are: 
creation (transposition on an exploitable format), selection, edition (refining), risk 
evaluation, contextualisation, signalling, exhibition and critical evaluation. All of these 
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steps generate complex economic transactions and contribute to the bridge building 
between consumer and the evaluation of a media good.  
 
Figure 1: Map of research 
In this paper, we identify and discuss research that has been conducted in each area. The 
amount of research produced in these areas is quite voluminous, we therefore focus 
especially our attention on papers analysing the publishing sector; this industry is 
undergoing large transformations due to the introduction of new digitized 
supports/network distributions (literally new “media”). For each interface outlined in 
the map, we highlight at first the results of recent studies on what are the effects induced 
by the technology on the supply chain.  We then discuss the few papers that have tried 
to approach the problem starting from a broader question that is, what are the effects of 
digitization on publishing protocols themselves. The discussion on these field or 
research is still open and needs further development, which we will suggest at the end 
of this review. Figure 1 indicates the research papers that are discussed in detail in this 
chapter. For ease of exposition, we cover these areas roughly chronologically; first 
describing the effects of digitization on procurement, then discussing opportunities and 
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treats introduced by digitized distribution and finally addressing the different marketing 
and pricing issues emerging in the industry. 
 
1.2. Procurement 
 
Digitization has brought important changes in the relationship between authors and 
publishers. In the traditional model, the work of unknown authors would be reviewed by 
experts from a publishing firm. The ones with the highest economic or cultural potential 
would then be selected, put under contract and made available for a mass diffusion in a 
target, usually geographically determined, market. On the other hand, companies would 
compete to enrol famous artists to empower their brand and to signal the quality of their 
products. Thanks to the new technologies, an unknown or rejected work can now be 
literally “published”,  or given to public, at very low cost and made available to the 
whole developed world through the internet, without any need of an editor. Moreover, 
authors may start growing or cultivate their audience by setting up a blog or a twitter 
account before even having physically published or produced any relevant work. They 
have the opportunity to by-pass the selection process by getting directly in contact with 
a digital distributor (Amazon, iBookstore, etc...). Their bargaining power with respect to 
publishers has potentially increased. On the other hand, the remuneration of published 
works is threatened by the ease with which works can be multiplied digitally. Copyright 
no longer seems capable of mediating between the interests of producers of works in 
getting paid for them and of their consumers in gaining access at a reasonable cost to 
what is produced. Moreover, digitized copyrighted works suffer from a lack of 
recognition and legislation. The problems are well known: unfavourable fiscal regimes 
with respect to their physical copies, widespread piracy, uncertainty on property rights 
and exhaustion principle (digitized copyrighted works are often sold as licenses, while 
their physical homologues are exchanged as goods). Finally, while bargaining power of 
authors has increased with respect to publishers, the bargaining power of an author with 
respect to a multinational digital distributor is infinitesimal.   
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One new role of publishers in the digital market is thus to federate authors and negotiate 
distribution conditions with the new agents in the value chain with relevant market 
power (distributors can often exploit larger economies of scale as well as control the 
access to contents in their networks).   
 
1.3. Distribution 
 
The deployment of network technologies based on bit encoding has opened new 
retailing channels for a large number of businesses. Digital distributors have a number 
of competitive advantages with respect to traditional shops: for example, they incur in 
lower costs for real estate, personnel and logistics. Moreover, they serve a global market 
without negligible transfer costs. In addition to this general features, in media industries 
digital distributors represent a differentiation opportunity, since they allow selling 
digitized versions of the same copyrighted products. The use of the Internet as an 
alternative distribution channel thus provides several opportunities to affect the 
interactions and performances of media industry’s supply chain.  
In order to manage the inevitable inclusion of the Internet as an integral part of the 
supply chain in a delicate industry such as the media one, which deals with experience 
cultural goods, subject to copyright, a number of strategic decisions and key variables, 
need to be analysed. The main strategic decision at the editor’s level is whether to 
vertically or horizontally integrate digital distribution. This will determine the range of 
opportunities they have to coordinate different facets of the supply chain. This decision 
is affected by firm specific characteristics but also by a number of variables related to 
the digital market (i.e. concentration, consumer preferences) and regulation (i.e. 
copyright, network access and product group).  
Starting from a standard abbreviated supply chain structure with a media editor selling 
products to a physical retailer, who in turns sells products to a customer through a 
traditional channel, such as a retail store or an industrial products distributorship, the 
basic options that are available for a Media editor to include digital distribution are the 
following: 
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1. Independent digital distribution: firm can establish cooperation with an 
independent digital distributor, such as Amazon, AppleStore or Google. (e.g. Gallimard) 
2. Vertical integration on digital market: firm can open a proprietary internet 
channel to directly reach the customers of his products, forward integrating to provide 
an alternative channel that is under his direct control (e.g. New York Times and many 
other news brands) 
3. Horizontal integration: physical retailer can use the capabilities of the internet to 
provide customers with multiple options for purchasing their products (e.g. relay kiosks 
network and its digital distributor relay.com) 
4. Mixed competition on digital market: firm owns an integrated digital distributor 
but also provide his products to independent digital distributors (e.g. Feltrinelli) 
 
1.4. Pricing 
 
The last fundamental interaction occurring in the value chain is the determination of the 
pricing structure. Pricing in a supply chain that involves the Internet is affected by 
several important issues. First of all, the internet channel provides an alternative 
retailing channel, so pricing must be made in the context of a multi-channel distribution, 
which means that the risks of cannibalization and free-riding must be embedded in the 
pricing structure. Moreover, digitization causes an expansion of the marketing tools 
available as well as an enlargement of the product array of an editor. In particular, since 
the internet allows for a relaxation of space, copying and distribution constraints, this 
results in the multiplication of versioning and bundling opportunities available for a 
firm in the media industry. As for customers, they typically view the internet channel as 
an imperfect substitute for a traditional channel, meaning that differences in customers’ 
expectations, format preferences or demographics must factor into any pricing 
decisions. These differences are themselves dependent on the degree of development of 
a network, which can be evaluated with the penetration rate in the population or with the 
share of media which are available for consumption in a given network. Finally the 
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emerging costs associated with the development of an internet channel may vary with 
respect to the distribution strategies and further complicates the pricing process.  
 
2. Procurement 
 
One major change caused by the development of digital platforms and networks in the 
media industry is the way in which procurement take place. Procurement can be defined 
for our purpose as the phase in which creators and editors of copyrighted contents 
bargain to settle the conditions for the economic exploitation of a media good. 
Digitization has certainly reduced transactions costs in this field and provided authors 
with a direct channel to publish their work. On the other hand, the separation of contents 
from their traditional support (book, cd, etc..) means growing possibilities of eluding 
copyright and uncertainty of regulation. These factors have further increased the risk of 
publishing for both authors and editors. In this section we present several papers that 
address important issues related to copyright issues in the digital era and regulation of 
digital media goods.  
 
2.1. Models, Tools and Incentives  for authors in the Digital Age  
 
Most economists and lawyers agree on the fact that Copyright no longer is up to the job 
of mediating between the interests of producers of works in getting paid for them and of 
their consumers in gaining access at a reasonable cost to what is produced. The problem 
in economic terms is how to provide the right incentives, in the emerging market 
conditions, for artists to produce an optimal level of new works in terms of quality, 
diversity and quantity. Technology itself provides tools that can help excludability, such 
as indexing, encryption and watermarking. However, the necessity of reviewing 
legislation in many key aspects of digital market such as responsibility of 
intermediaries, accessibility of information, ownership and exhaustion is the most 
debated aspect.  
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Zimmerman (2003) 
The author focuses the analysis on the Street Performer Protocol, one of the most 
interesting models based on voluntary compensation of artists, first introduced by 
Kelsey & Schneier in 1999. In this model, the author set a release price for a work, and 
commits to make it available in digital form, without copyright restrictions, once 
members of the public voluntarily contribute sufficient funds to meet the asking price. 
The releaser can of course be a publisher, which could be responsible, as in the 
traditional model, for selecting and signalling the quality of the future work and for 
internalizing transaction costs. The success of the expectations on the work would then 
become the key variable determining whether the work is actually released or not. Once 
the work is released, since it has already been paid for, it will then reside in the public 
domain.  
The point of view of the author is that a public license for digital free use and 
distribution would solve the problem of authors’ remuneration without the need of 
intrusive measures to police and prevent unmetered distribution. Furthermore, this 
limited license leaves open the opportunity for authors to exploit the most successful 
digitally published work in the traditional way with the advantage of knowing more 
about consumers’ preferences. This model, besides its many interesting points, presents 
different problems from an economic point of view. First of all, the utility of experience 
goods such as books or music is revealed to consumers only after consumption, thus an 
ex-ante evaluation of the work made by the authors or a publisher is complex and will 
hardly match the revealed market value of the work. Moreover, the problem of 
information asymmetry will increase with the authors having an incentive in over 
promoting their work in order to reach the desired return. Finally, the future exploitation 
on the traditional channel of a content which is already public raises again the questions 
on whether a digital version should be treated equally, from a legal point of view, to the 
same content published on a different support. 
Under current law, copyright vests automatically upon the fixation of a work in tangible 
(including digital) form; on the other hand, digital works are sold through licenses and 
are often regarded as “electronic goods”, while physical works are regulated by ad hoc 
legislation regarding “cultural goods”. Beside the complex general application of this 
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model as a substitute of the traditional publishing protocols, this example show that new 
way of producing media are available in the market. The Street Performer Protocol 
could apply, for example, to new publishing protocols in which ownership itself is 
under questioning such as blogs or tweets. With this protocol, consumers could reward 
authors through a sort of renewable subscription, which allow them to produce new 
contents and grow the number of readers as well as their loyalty.  
Lian & Chen & Wang (2010) 
The authors try to solve the problem of copyright in multimedia networks using 
technologic tools; more specifically, they set up a content distribution and copyright 
authentication system based on media index and watermarking techniques. 
Watermarking technique is commonly used to protect multimedia content’s ownership. 
It consists in imperceptibly modifying the media good embedding the ownership 
information directly in the file. Once a media is watermarked, the ownership 
information can be extracted and used for authentication at a later point in time. In order 
to simplify the authentication process, the authors suggest that after the process, the 
robust features and content emendation are extracted from the watermarked media and 
registered in a feature database that constitute a database for copy detection so that it 
provides a filter for the file to be checked. Authentication of suspicious files becomes a 
smooth and immediate second step of the process. This system has the advantage that it 
is capable of detecting copyright infringements even if the file has been modified, for 
example through compression, rotation, shearing, scaling or translation.  
The system proposed by Lian, Chen & Wang gives great results in terms of 
identification of authentic copies, but it does not actually solve the problem of authors’ 
remuneration unless coupled with a regulation preventing users who have an authentic 
copy to share it as they would do with a physical book or video or compact disk. 
Moreover, regulation would need to provide the right incentives to digital distributors in 
order for them to apply these tools. In a digital market characterized by safe harbour 
status for distributors this system would not solve the issue. 
Travis (2006)   
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In this article, the author discusses the legislation of fair use in the digital era based on 
the case of Google Books Search. It concludes that not only this service makes a fair use 
of copyrighted contents, but it has a positive effect both for publishers and authors by 
providing a solution to the paradox of experience good marketing . The arguments 
adopted are that Google service provides enhanced sampling possibilities for 
consumers, thus reducing the information asymmetry due to the characteristics of 
experience goods. Moreover, the author evaluates substitutability and finds out that it 
can be kept under control establishing limits on sampling and considering that the 
physical supports are not perfectly substitutable. In the authors opinion a digital 
sampling service does not have a negative impact on sales of book, like i-tunes 30 
second sampling of songs. On the contrary, it has a positive effect for authors and 
publishers since it is a powerful marketing tool. Unfortunately the positive expectations 
of the model have not been realized in the last years, readers’ and publishers’ returns 
have been suffering constant reduction, since the introduction of Google Book Search. 
Two factors have contributed to mine the theory exposed in this paper. On the one side, 
the emergence of new digital technologies and networks have increased the 
substitutability between physical and digital versions of a media good, in particular 
concerning accessibility and comfort of reading. On the other side, in this article the 
author did not consider negative externalities of the application of traditional fair use 
and of digital sampling in the emerging competitive environment of digital media. An 
emerging trend is that the diffusion of digitized media, since they are all exploitable on 
the same support, has reduced the segmentation of media markets. On platforms such as 
tablets or smartphones, all media compete against each other more closely for the time 
consecrated to entertainment or learning activities by a consumer.  Moreover, the search 
for information by samples is a new consumption habit that is steadily growing.  Thus 
Google Search Book, by providing a large database of information without any 
compensation for the authors, can as well be included among the factors leading to 
structural decrease in sales of the industry. On the other hand, this service is 
undoubtedly beneficial for consumers in the short term since it has reduced the 
transaction cost to find information or books as well as providing an invaluable tool for 
the conservation of cultural heritage of human being. Nevertheless, we may argue 
whether the latter objective should be left in the hand of a private company which, by 
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following her objective of maximizing profits, may in certain cases be incentivised to 
distort the access to this worldwide bibliography.  
Darling (2012) 
In this work the authors analyse the approaches undertaken by the United States, 
Germany and France towards copyright law in order to deal with the problems of 
bargaining asymmetry and predicting the future success of creative works. While the 
former has instated author termination rights, some legal systems prevent authors from 
licensing the rights to unknown uses of their work. The perspective of the paper is a mix 
of law and economics. The conclusion is that surplus redistribution is likely to be 
unfavourable to authors if no action is taken to adapt copyright to the digital market. 
However, the authors finds out also that restricting what she defines as “new-use-right 
grants” may not redress effectively this distortion in surplus reallocation. Since the 
prediction of the financial success of an experience good is rather complicate and 
subject to sudden changes during the timeframe of a contract, United States copyright 
law allows authors to grant publishers the rights to all known or unknown uses of a 
work. New media developments have prompted litigation and raised the issue of which 
exclusive rights should be implicitly licensed has never been resolved with consistency. 
In most European countries, granting rights to uses unknown at the time of the contract 
is prohibited. The objective of this approach is to ensure that authors are not excluded 
from unforeseen future returns because of incautiousness, inexperience, or lack of 
bargaining power in dealing with publishers. The author argues that this solution may 
have effects that counteract the legislative goals in the digital era. Restricting the grant 
of rights to unknown uses means that a new contract negotiation is necessary between 
author and publisher whenever a new distribution method or a new version of the 
product emerge. This renegotiation may resolve in consistent emerging transaction 
costs, especially if the number of negotiations is high or the emergence of new uses is 
frequent, as it seems to be the case in digital publishing in the last decade. This situation 
may put pressure on publishers’ margins without any benefit for authors or it may as 
well harm authors by decreasing the total number of rights transfers. In light of these 
results, restrictions on granting the rights to new uses in the digital era should be 
considered with caution, as they might not be suitable instruments for distributing 
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wealth to creators. The findings of this article thus confirm the difficulties of adapting 
traditional copyright law to a digital market.  
Landes & Lichtman (2003) 
The exponential increase of piracy in the digital media industry is partially caused by 
the uncertainty in responsibility for copyright infringement. When individuals infringe 
copyright on the internet, they often do that using tools, services, and venues provided 
by other agents. Thus before punishing infringements, regulation should establish to 
what extent private users and other parties such as distributors, ISP or others should be 
held liable for the resulting infringement. In this paper the authors introduce and 
evaluates from an economic perspective the main common law doctrines and statutory 
provisions in modern copyright law. The starting line is that unlike the Patent Act, the 
Copyright Act of 1976 does not explicitly recognize the possibility of indirect liability. 
Nevertheless courts have held third parties liable for copyright infringement under two 
long-standing common law doctrines: contributory infringement  and vicarious liability 
.  
A provision that has significantly expanded indirect liability is the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, which stated that it is illegal for a firm to manufacture, import, or 
provide to consumers a device primarily designed “to descramble a scrambled work, to 
decrypt an encrypted work, or to avoid technological measures used to protect 
copyrighted work. This provision is controversial since it holds a party liable for 
undermining technological protections even if no resulting act of infringement occurs. 
On the other hand, it is a clear recognition of the fact that traditional forms of copyright 
protection are not adapted to a digital market. The intuition on which it is based is, in 
fact, that many copyright owners use technology to protect their work since this sort of 
self-help is less costly and more effective than copyright enforcement. In the authors’ 
view, an efficient approach to indirect liability applied to a digital environment might 
start by applying a negligence rule  to any activity that can lead to copyright 
infringement. Another critical aspect of regulation is the safe harbour provision. Thanks 
to this provision, Internet service providers and digital distributors have been immune 
from indirect liability until recent judgments against Ebay and Google. That has 
eliminated the risk created by an otherwise uncertain legal standard and has favoured 
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the development of a few large digital distributors in the digital market. Another 
authors’ proposal for an efficient indirect liability regime, which is being discussed also 
in Europe recently, is to include a tailored tax applicable to particular tools, services, or 
venues associated with copyright infringement. The tax can be then used to compensate 
those agents which have been harmed excessively by the infringements. Indirect 
liability is not the only instrument to improve the efficiency of copyright in the digital 
era. The most obvious mechanism is to make adjustments to the scope and duration of 
copyright protection, or less obviously, to the criminal penalties now applicable to 
certain types of infringement. Another hypothesis is to set cash incentives put forward 
by the National Endowment for the Arts. 
   
To summarize, the review of recent literature seems to suggest that technologic 
developments do not simply require the adaptation of traditional copyright tools; on the 
other hand, a deep rethinking of intellectual property rights exchange and protection is 
foreseeable in order to create a level playing field for authors and publishers in a multi-
support and multi-distribution industry. 
 
2.2. New perspectives in the economic analysis of digitization 
 
Cope & Kalantzis (2010) 
The authors explore key aspects of contemporary transformations, not just in the textual 
forms of digital representation, but the emerging social forms that digitisation reflects, 
affords and supports. They try to describe ‘social web’, a term the use to include in 
digitization the new relationships between knowledge and culture that are emerging in 
the era of pervasively interconnected computing. Then they use this analysis to evaluate 
the impacts and potentials of these changes on the processes of formation of new 
knowledge. In the first part of the article the authors review what is new and not new 
about the emerging regime of digitised text. Among the latter, authors name ‘hypertext’, 
considered nothing other than a version of the process of referencing, or the ‘virtual’ 
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aspect, which they suggest it is just a reincarnation of the modes of representation of 
distant people, places and objects that made books so alluring. On the other hand, 
among the truly new features of digitized contents, the authors include the economies of 
cultural and epistemic scale. Whilst something like one thousand copies needs to be 
sold to make a print run viable, there is no difference in the cost of one person or a 
thousand reading a web page, or a print-on-demand book. The consequence is that the 
amount of published and accessible content is rapidly growing and the average number 
of copies accessed of each academic work is declining (Waters 2004). These are ideal 
conditions for the development of every more finely grained areas of knowledge, 
cultural perspectives and localised applications of knowledge. The conclusion of the 
authors is that this change is so significant that knowledge itself may change. Another 
key feature is the intrinsic multimodality of the new media. Bit encoding make written 
words, images and sounds of the same zeros and ones of semiconductor circuitry. In 
what other ways might knowledge be represented today, and particularly in the areas of 
the sciences, the arts (Martin and Booth 2007) and design?  
Finally, there is what authors call a shift in the balance of textual agency between the 
author and reader (Kalantzis and Cope 2008), namely a blurring of the boundaries 
between authors and readers. If print limited the scope for dialogue, the electronic 
communications web opens up that scope. Digitization has also changed the social 
relations of representation. Audiences have become users. The division of labour 
between the creators of culture or knowledge and their consumers has been blurred. The 
direction knowledge flows is changing. In fact, the flows are now multifarious and in 
many directions. Consumers are also creators, and creators, consumers. Knowledge and 
authority are more contingent, provisional, and conditional; they are more open to 
contestation and to critical reading on the basis of personal experience and voice. 
The conclusions of the authors, is that to make the most of the new digital 
communications media, we need to move beyond the question of business models and 
the binaries of the commercial publishing/open access debate. The resolution will 
probably be found in hybrid models and a genuine pluralism of different solutions for 
different domains of knowledge creation. Open access publishing is likely to grow, and 
develop sustainability models based on explicit subsidy by institutions and research 
funders, and possibly also low cost author publication fees. Commercial publishing 
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needs to reduce its cost structures, and if the big publishers can’t, innovative new 
entrants will. And then there will be hybrid solutions in which some knowledge is made 
available at no cost, and other knowledge at a price, all in the same space instead of 
today’s bifurcated commercial/non-commercial spaces. Whatever the models of 
sustainability that emerge, in the author’s view knowledge systems of the near future 
could and should be very different from those of our recent past. The sites of formal 
knowledge validation and documentation will be more dispersed. They will be more 
global, mainly using the lingua franca of English. The knowledge processes they use 
will be more reflexive and so more thorough and reliable. Knowledge will be published 
more quickly, and through semantic publishing it will be more discoverable and open to 
aggregation and reinterpretation. There will be much more of it, but it will be much 
easier to navigate.  In conclusion, the author believes that it would be the responsibility 
of knowledge workers to realise the promise of the internet and to create more 
responsive, equitable and powerful knowledge ecologies. 
Bomsel & al.(2012) 
In this book the author analyses publishing industry with the objective of defining what 
the intrinsic meaning of the verb to publish is. This question is fundamental, in order to 
develop industry specific analysis or design policy measures in a context of structural 
changes imposed by digitization. The starting point is that media function is to make 
private expressions available for the appropriation of society. Media content, when 
published, is an edited object, adapted to a certain type of consumption, connoted with 
brands and labels, which provide it with a defined social usage. The dematerialization of 
books, sounds, images, movies, music, coupled with their real-time circulation on 
digital networks, obscure progressively these elements, these traditional supports of 
publishing. Moreover, the usage of the internet for correspondence and private 
transactions, ranged in social networks which are able to structure communities, blurs 
the boarders of private and public in new ways. Mechanically attaching the attribute of 
information to any digitized string, bit-encoding technique has created a category of 
good which is common to all communication technologies. This category, by including 
in bits financial transactions as well as conversations, regulation as well as media, 
becomes often confusing, since strings of bits are immaterial; they represent costless 
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reproduction, infinite diffusion and free-lunch. As a consequence, this category 
becomes controversial when appropriation, transparency, privacy are in question.  
The central hypothesis of the author is that digitization is a written language, a 
communication system based on a visual and spatial support capable of translating the 
meaning of language in a string of discrete signs that can be recognised and reused. In 
the digital era, digitization is the handwriting in which vectors of meaning are encoded 
and transmitted. The meaning transmitted by a media, however, is the result of accrued 
expressions, which take form only after its edition, when the « rotary press » starts 
working. It is the firm that transform natural expression in a work and the transition, 
which includes an effect on the meaning of the expression, is what the author calls the 
publishing protocol. The editor is the authority which gives a symbolic status to 
authors’ expressions. The industrial transformation behind this institution is composed 
of different steps: selection, risk evaluation, contextualization, marketing mix 
elaboration, signalling, exhibition, critical evaluation, distribution, etc. Each step 
embeds complex economic transactions which contribute to create the utility of editing 
for consumers, the effect on the meaning. The economic impact of edition is thus 
significant in publishing, thus the author suggest that digitization may not abolish all 
kinds of publishing protocols, on the other hand it will create more protocols, because 
media never had such an important economic and institutional impact in history. The 
myths, brands, authors, actors, musicians, product, politicians that new media contribute 
to create have never been so powerful.  
Another important question is the difference between publishing and posting. In the 
author’s view, posting is not publishing. Making a file available online is not sufficient 
to create a demand for it. In media industries what structures utility is not quite the 
expression itself, but is the meaning of the media-good modelled through the publishing 
protocol. The intuition is thus that editing, which metaphorically can be described as 
decorating and create the value of decoration, in an overly-connected society requires a 
continuously growing investment effort. Digitization makes it harder for editors to 
perform their symbolic functions, which results in publishing, both from a practical and 
from an economic point of view  
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Economists have ignored this process for too long, concentrating research efforts on the 
organization of the supply chain and on transaction costs. The relationships between the 
firm and consumers that are systematically analysed are limited to vertical relations in 
distribution and pricing and advertising strategies. The questions related to publishing 
protocols, in the phase before the launch on the market, are often delegated to marketing 
experts. However, these operations which are informational and symbolic are associated 
to investments and risks, with scale and scope economies and with competitive markets 
with frequent innovations. Moreover, they are strictly connected with the distribution 
side of the supply chain of the products to which they add a value in term of meaning 
and mediatisation. Finally, they create utility dynamics which require specific 
regulation. These processes are critical for firms’ competitiveness and for territories 
since they make consumers pay for myths, imagination of products, allowing drifting 
away from pure price competition. 
Among the conclusions of the paper, a number indicate interesting avenues for further 
thinking and research: 
 First of all the activities which compose publishing protocols and the media 
firms that contribute to the passage from expressions to media goods are substantially 
different from those of private correspondence. Research shows that these firms exist 
since the invention of handwriting, that they play an essential role in the organisation of 
societies and that they perform a variety of processes comparable to the variety of 
expression that they transform. These concepts are essential to model their economic 
function, their industrial organization or their market regulation.  
 The complexity of editing comes from the distance (in terms of time lag, 
physical distance, accumulation of meaning, etc.) between creation and public 
demonstration. This distance changes substantially among different publishing 
protocols. The distance generates a number of interactions, which need to be 
coordinated and organized with contracts, among agents in the publishing protocol. 
 The two key phases of each different protocol are: (1) accumulation, in which 
the architecture of meaning is established. (2) Display, is the phase in which expression 
is accrued and published. Editors are responsible for this phase, they validate the 
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publishing protocol. Only once the work is published, the commercial results come into 
play. The latter will be determined by the resonance of the work and its chronotope .  
 Digitization has reduced the business cycle of media industries by increasing 
infinitely the frequency at which publishing can occur online. Real-time information has 
reduced the attention and the utility of narrative chronotopes, which are constantly set 
on a time-lag with respect to present. In the author’s opinion, the biggest revolution of 
digitization is thus not dematerialization of support but this reduction to real-time of the 
display phase of media contents. As an example, in the press industry this continuous 
need for “refresh” is producing negative externalities for it pollutes editorials articles 
and reduces publishers’ profits eliminating the possibility of synchronized display of 
journals. The future of the industry will thus depend on the capacity of reconciliation, 
through bundle pricing, of the display phases and chronotopes of real-time information 
and editorials. 
  The media supply chain needs to be put under questioning by analysing where 
the creation of utility occurs. Decomposing the processes of creation edition and 
publishing the author identifies three economic issues: (1) The mediatisation allowing 
crystallising and disseminating the meaning of expressions; (2) the creation of value 
through accretion of context; (3) the institutions and regulations providing a framework 
for these operations.  
 On the regulation side, copyright is the institution entitled of protecting the 
accretion phase. It gives incentives to editors for investing in the accretion and financing 
the display phase. However, once the media-object gets published, it is published under 
a single or multiple publishing brands which are instituted to protect the investment 
made after the accretion phase. These two institutions are thus complementary and 
piracy affects both copyrighted work and publishing brand. Thus law makers should 
take a comprehensive approach when they try to design the instruments capable of 
protecting IP in the digital era.  
 The economics of mediatisation can be considered as a complementary good 
which generates utility by creating resonance for meaningful expressions. For some 
products, demand follows mediatisation, thus justifying intense advertising investments. 
For other products 
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3. Distribution 
 
Digitization provides an alternative distribution channel, which can be added or 
substituted to the existing and which allows for selling products directly to customers. 
The internet is a viable option for selling traditional goods and, in the case of media 
industry, for the distribution of digitized works, which are substitutable products, 
although arguably not perfectly, for their physical homologues. This innovation thus 
affects in many ways the interactions and performance of media industries supply chain, 
further complicating firms’ strategic decision. The new problem to solve is how to 
maximize profits, efficiently distributing an array of substitutable versions in a multi-
channel scenario. On the demand side, typically customers view the internet channel as 
an imperfect substitute for a traditional channel and thus have different willingness to 
pay not only for different versions but also for different delivery modes. Moreover the 
costs associated with distribution through the internet are likely to vary from those of 
the existing channel, further complicating the analysis required to determine the optimal 
retailing structure for each product. In this chapter, we discuss the trade-off between the 
enhanced discrimination tools offered by digitization and the negative externalities 
caused by the introduction of a substitutable distribution network offering a larger array 
of products, in term of cannibalization and free-riding of investment. 
 
3.1. Coordinating Traditional and Digitized Distribution 
 
Cattani et al. (2005) 
The author analyses a scenario where a firm with a traditional retailer adds a direct 
Internet channel that is in competition with the traditional channel. Initially, the firm 
chooses wholesale prices as a Stackelberg leader and commits to setting a direct channel 
retail price that matches the retailer’s price in the traditional channel, in order to 
mitigate cannibalization. Under this general equal-pricing strategy, the authors study the 
56 
 
effects of different pricing strategies on profits. The strategies are: (1) keep wholesale 
prices as they were before, (2) keep retail prices as they were before, or (3) select 
wholesale and retail prices that optimize profits for the manufacturer. They found out 
that the latter may also be preferred by the retailer and customers. Another result is that 
the equal-pricing strategy is appropriate as long as the Internet channel is significantly 
less convenient than the traditional channel. If the Internet channel is of comparable 
convenience to the traditional channel, then the manufacturer has a strong incentive to 
abandon the equal-pricing policy, which results in a sever cannibalization of the 
traditional channel. The author’s suggest an analogy to the parable of the boiling frog. 
The parable states that a frog thrown into a pot of boiling water will quickly jump out. 
But a frog thrown into a pot of temperate water may stay even if the temperature is 
slowly raised to boiling, leading to the untimely demise of the frog. By introducing an 
Internet channel with equal pricing, the firm places the traditional retailer in a mildly 
competitive position where the retailer may even benefit if the Internet is more costly 
and less convenient on average to the population of customers. However, when the costs 
and average convenience of the Internet channel become more favourable, then the 
manufacturer will be in a position to use the direct channel to undercut the prices in the 
traditional channel – and “boil” the traditional retailer. The model uses individual 
customers with linear utility, decreasing in the price and the channel-specific purchase 
effort of the product. At first, authors show that if a new channel is introduced by the 
firm, and she makes no adjustment to wholesale prices, then there is upward pressure on 
retail prices. Although the retailer faces increased competition (compared to the 
monopoly position of the base case), the competition effect is more than offset by the 
ability of the players to segment the market. With the addition of a new channel, some 
customers who were at a relatively far distance from the traditional channel will find the 
new channel to be convenient and will be willing to pay a higher price. Retailer will 
increase prices, extracting surplus from closer consumers. However, decreasing sales in 
the traditional channel, due to cannibalization, results in lower expected profits. The 
firm is constrained by equal prices, so she benefits only if her costs are sufficiently low 
that web sales are sufficiently profitable to offset reduced sales in the traditional 
channel. To sum up, the retailer is worse off in spite of the manufacturer’s efforts to 
minimize cannibalization. On the other end, if the firm sets the wholesale price so that 
retail prices will remain unchanged, then this wholesale price will be lower than the 
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prior price. This strategy results in higher expected profits for the retailer, while the 
manufacturer experiences higher expected profits if and only if the costs in the new 
channel are sufficiently low. The introduction of the new channel in this case benefits to 
customers with a low web effort. All of the original customers continue to buy but 
market penetration is larger due to increased differentiation. Meanwhile, the reduction 
in wholesale price more than compensates the retailer for the loss of those customers 
who were willing to buy in the traditional channel but now switch to the direct channel. 
Finally, by allowing both the wholesale price and the retail price to vary, the authors 
find that firm’s profits will be greater than in any other strategy. If costs in the new 
channel are sufficiently low, the retail price will be lower than the base case. However, 
if web channel costs are sufficiently high, the retail price that maximizes supply chain 
profits exceeds the base case retail price, even though double marginalization is 
eliminated. Other things being equal, higher web-channel costs reduce the average 
profitability of sales over the two channels.  
To sum up, the introduction of a direct channel can harm or benefit the retailer. 
Surprisingly, the retailer prefers the scenario where the firm acts optimally in terms of 
her own objectives. While average retailer profits decrease notably under fixed 
wholesale price, they increase slightly under fixed retail price and grow substantially 
when the firm maximizes her profits. The objectives of the manufacturer and the retailer 
are connected through the manufacturer’s commitment to matching the retail price set 
by the retailer. In this model, if free to set a different price on the web channel, the 
manufacturer would almost always want to price much lower on the web channel. 
Finally, if the web channel becomes more convenient over time, the firm has more 
incentives to undercut the retailer. The authors cite the music and software industries as 
examples of this behaviour, stating that by allowing differential pricing across the two 
channels and using her advantage as Stackelberg leader, the firm can sharply increase 
profits to the detriment of the retailer. Unfortunately, the predicted increase in profits 
for firms in the media and information good industries has not been observed in 
practice. While differentials in price have been observed, these have not resulted from 
strategic behaviour of firms but rather from higher pressure on retail prices in the new 
channel, due to increased competition among products, to the increasing market power 
of large digital distributors and even to devaluation of media goods caused by the 
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availability of cheap (or free due to illegal distribution) substitutable products. All these 
key factors are ruled out by this model in which the new channel is under direct control 
of the firm and has no competition, unlike what is observable in the market. Moreover, 
the authors do not consider in their analysis the negative externalities caused by the 
introduction of the new channel due to the freeriding effect on the investment in the 
traditional channels. These investments, especially for media industries such as 
publishing, are fundamental to create the resonance around new products as explained 
in the previous section. Cutting traditional retailers out may have negative externalities 
both on the variety and on the quality of media production.  
Gentzkow (2007) 
The author develops a model to study empirically the competition between hardcopies 
sold through traditional distribution channels and online versions sold through a direct 
digital distributor. Drawing data on newspapers’ market, he estimates the relationship 
between the print and online papers in demand, the welfare impact of the online paper’s 
introduction and the expected impact of charging positive online prices. The debate on 
the degree of substitutability between old and new products has always been an 
important input to many policy studies. More recently, policy makers have focused on 
substitutability between physical and digital products, for example on whether vertical 
agreements should be tolerated for industries with substitutable distribution channels.  
In this paper the author extends techniques for estimating the impact of new goods, 
allowing for goods to be either substitutes or complements. The discrete demand model 
that he develops permits consumers to choose multiple goods simultaneously and allows 
the demand-side relationship between each pair of products to be freely estimated from 
the data. The results show that properly accounting for consumer heterogeneity both 
reduced-form OLS regressions and a structural model without heterogeneity suggest 
that the print and online editions of a newspaper are strong complements. In contrast, 
estimating the full model with both observed and unobserved heterogeneity, the author 
finds that the print and online editions are significant substitutes. Moreover, the author 
develops two approaches to estimate the effects of charging a positive price for online 
contents which are usually provided free of charge. The first approach assumes that the 
firm may be setting the price of the online edition sub optimally, and ask whether 
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profits could be increased by charging positive prices. The result is that, for the period 
under study, the optimal price is indeed positive, so the firm experiences some losses 
from charging the suboptimal price of zero. The second approach supposes that the zero 
price is optimal, and ask how large transactions costs would have to be to rationalize it. 
The result in this case is that a zero price would be optimal for any transaction cost 
higher than a threshold. Moreover, the author shows that because of growth in online 
advertising demand, the gain obtainable raising online prices was eliminated by 2004. 
This suggests that the zero price may have been part of a rational forward-looking 
strategy and is approximately optimal today. To sum up, the author finds that print and 
online versions are clearly substitutes; however, he finds that the magnitude of the 
crowding out of print readership is relatively smaller in his sample. His conclusion is 
thus that the advent of online newspapers does not appear to threaten the survival of 
print media. Moreover, he finds out that welfare benefits of the online newspaper appear 
to outweigh its costs since consumers gain from free provision of the online paper, and 
although the firm appeared to suffer a net loss during the 2000–2003 periods, an 
improved advertising market could outweigh the calculated annual effect on firm 
profits. Finally, the authors find that in the period under study, the firm could have 
increased profits by charging a positive price for online content. Both three conclusions 
have not been confirmed by the trend of the industry in the years following this paper. 
Digital distribution has proved to be a serious treat for print versions, with a boost in 
failing rates among traditional newspapers. Moreover, total welfare effect has not been 
so clear. The access to digitized information on the net is not completely free, on the 
other hand the remuneration has been progressively transferred from news providers to 
service providers or search engines or social networks exploiting media contents. The 
positive effect on profits due to increased advertising demand has never out-weighted 
the total costs for firms (cannibalization of paper sales plus investment plus 
organizational costs). This is due to the much lower rates which advertisers are willing 
to pay for digitized pages of newspapers or magazine with respect to paper pages. Last 
but not least, firm have been struggling to charge a positive price for their online 
contents, mostly because of the different competitive environment that has been 
developing on the digital market. As analysed in a previous section, the digital market 
have increased competition for media, both reducing transaction costs and decreasing 
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differentiation between broadcasting, delivering written or visual contents and other 
media segments.   
Simon & Kadiyali (2007) 
The authors examine how offering digital content affects demand for print magazines. 
They find strong evidence that digital content cannibalizes print sales. However, the 
effect varies with the type of digital content offered. Offering digital access to the entire 
contents of the current print magazine slightly reduces print sales. On the other hand, 
even if there is no evidence that digital content complements print magazines, offering 
limited access mitigates the cannibalization effect. The hypothesis from which the 
authors start is that a physical magazine and its websites are seemingly perfect 
substitutes for their print counterparts. Although we will see in the next session that this 
hypothesis can be argued, especially following the advent of portable e-readers, which 
have created new complementary utilities for consumers in terms of accessibility and 
portability, the fact that the substitutability effect prevails in media industries is 
confirmed both from theoretical and empirical studies. On the other hand, a magazine’s 
website may complement its print version by increasing diffusion of a publishing brand. 
Moreover, the Web’s interactive features are likely to increase loyalty of clients pushing 
more readers towards subscriptions. The key element of this paper is that it analyses the 
type and the amount of digital content that are made available through the new 
distribution channel. Unfortunately, the results indicate that digital content substitutes 
for print content no matter the type or amount of free content that is released online, 
while providing no evidence of complementarities. However, the results of the authors 
also emphasize that, for most consumers, digital content is not a perfect substitute for 
print media. More than 90% of readers continue to buy the print magazine when the 
identical content is available on line, for free. The new supports which are conceived in 
order to read articles and book more comfortably, have inevitably affected this trend. 
However, anticipating this further increase in cannibalization, many brands have started 
to set paying offers on these supports, leaving the free accessibility only to less 
comfortable devices. It thus seems that this is a key variable for the future of digitized 
market. If consumers’ willingness to pay keeps increasing with the increased comfort of 
digital reading, firms will be able to mitigate cannibalisation by adjusting the price of 
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digital version, while if the free model keeps dominating the digitized market, the 
pressure on margins will keep to take a heavy toll on publishing firms. 
Bernstein, Sheng Song & Zheng (2005) 
This paper examines how free riding affects a firm’s decision of running a direct 
distribution channel (online or offline), when there are fixed plus incremental variable 
costs for operating the direct store. Free riding in a multi-channel supply chain occurs 
when one retail channel engages in the customer service activities necessary to sell a 
product, while another channel benefits from those activities by making the final sale. 
The authors suggest that, although free riding generally has a negative impact on supply 
chain performance, certain recent practices seem to suggest an opposite view. For 
example a firm could choose to set up an Internet direct channel just to offer 
information to consumers, limiting product offerings online. The Internet increases 
exponentially consumers’ ability to access a wide range of information sources at low 
costs and consequently in increase the possibility of free riding, introducing negative 
externalities in multi-channel supply chains. Common approaches that firms use to 
mitigate free riding among retailers include, for example, exclusive territory provisions 
or limits in the number of firms selling a product in one area, sharing sales effort 
expenses with retailers, engaging in resale price maintenance. In the digital market, 
however, most of these tools are unavailable or illegal. On the other hand, free riding 
can sometimes induce positive effects: it is the case when manufacturers knowingly 
allow retailers to free ride on the customer service efforts of their direct stores in order 
to increase global sales. However, even if potentially beneficial, this strategy embeds 
emerging risks. First of all, stores are costly to operate and incur high fixed costs. 
Secondly, consumers may use the stores to educate themselves about the product, but 
then buy a rival product at a lower price.  
To investigate the effects of free riding when a direct channel is set up, the authors 
consider a setting with a firm selling its product through an independent retailer and, at 
the same time, contemplating offering the product through its own direct store. They 
investigate the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s pricing decisions with and without a 
direct store, at first assuming that there is only one product and that all consumers visit 
the direct store before deciding on a purchase. Later in the paper, they extend the 
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previous setting to consider the existence of a lower-end competing product carried by 
the retailer. Finally, they extend the single product setting to consider two consumer 
segments, thus only consumers in one segment need the service provided at the direct 
store before making their purchase decisions. The major finding of the include: (1) 
When the firm operates a direct store it sets the price higher than that at the retail store; 
(2) The retailer benefits with the presence of a direct channel only when the 
inconvenience experienced by consumers to buy the product at the retail store after 
visiting the direct store is not too high and not too low; (3) With the existence of a 
closely substitutable product, the value of the direct channel for the firm decreases as 
the consumers’ valuation for the competing product increases, while the retailer is 
always better off by distributing two products, regardless of the presence of a direct 
channel; and (4) As the proportion of consumers in need of sales service increases, all 
firms’ prices first decrease and then increase due to the combined effects of increased 
consumer valuation for the products and intensified competition between the two 
channels. (5) Extending the model to consider inventory availability at the retail store, 
they find that when the costs of operating the direct store are high, the manufacturer 
needs to ensure a high level of product availability at the retail store. 
The analysis conducted in the paper suggests that, in some contexts, the direct channel 
may merely be a service provider and make no sales. For example, when the variable 
costs incurred for sales at the direct store are high, no sales occur at the direct channel. 
In contrast, the firm may be better off by selling its product through the direct store, 
avoiding sales through retail channels when the direct channel’s variable operational 
costs are not too high. Interestingly, the authors find that, even if adding a direct 
channel generally favours the firm, the supply chain as a whole may not benefit, 
meaning that  the incentives of the firm and the supply chain may not be aligned 
regarding the decision to open a direct store. 
 
3.2. Multi-distribution Related Impacts on Media Industries and Total Welfare 
 
Schweizer (2002) 
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In this paper the author explains how the quality certification processes for 
technological and stylistic innovations differ and how they may interact in the media 
industries. Stylistic and technological innovation may take place in the content or in the 
form of media products. The author argues that the interaction between these types of 
innovation depends on their location within the product and on the characteristics of the 
certification schemes faced by the producing firms. Innovation in the media industry has 
been discussed by economists mainly in the context of technological innovations and 
with reference to manufacturing. On the other hand, artistic innovation and the 
interaction of technological innovation with such other types of innovation have been 
neglected. According to the author, a media product can be deconstructed into three 
parts. First, there is the core of the product, which for a media product will represent the 
thematic part or message of the product. This core together with the inner form 
represents the content of a product, in turn surrounded by the outer form of the product. 
The inner form in the case of a book would be the ‘literary form’ , while the outer form 
includes in a wider sense the way in which the content is transmitted and presented to 
the consumers. In the case of a book this would include design characteristics of the 
cover, but also new technologies in the mode and means of producing and transmitting 
content to the consumer. Technological innovation, however, may not only figure in the 
form, but also in the content of a product. In the content, technology may open up new 
stylistic opportunities in the ‘inner form’. Vice versa, stylistic innovation may not only 
occur in the content, but also in the outer form, where it is usually referred to as design 
innovation. Content innovations in the media industries, such as stylistic innovations in 
the inner form of the content or innovations in its core tend to be highly certifier-
dependent. This is mainly due to the experience and credence qualities of such 
innovations, which means that belief in the quality experienced by others forms a 
central part in the perception of such products, a belief, which the certifiers have the 
power to create. In the media content industries these certifiers are professional critics 
or experts who work independently or within publishing firms. The better the firm’s or 
critic’s reputation, the more it will act as a certifier of quality in its own right . Building 
on these considerations the author proposes a definition of stylistic innovation 
applicable to management analysis. In his view, stylistic innovation is the sum of the 
features in a product or the process of its production, which differentiate a producer 
from other producers, based on differences in their cognitive structures underlying the 
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realization of new means and ends in a product and its production process, which do not 
match with the collective expectations in a particular certification environment, but are 
recognized as novel. This concept, coupled with the concepts of reputation, identity and 
the certification scheme are then used by the author to try and explain variations in the 
interaction between the different innovation types. Drawing on two case studies the 
author indicates that, although the representatives of the media technology industry do 
not seem to be conscious of these interactions, some of their statements do refer to the 
tension between style and technology. In contrast, in the media content industry the 
awareness of the techno-stylistic interactions seems stronger. Finally, the author sets a 
number of hypotheses as potential departure points for future research in this area. (1) 
The interaction between different types of innovation in the content and the form of 
media products depends on the characteristics of the certification schemes typically 
faced by the producing firms in particular industries. (2) In the certification scheme 
governing sectors of the publishing industry in which the importance of stylistic 
innovation as a quality indicator is higher, technological innovation visible in the form 
of a product is more likely to unfavourably influence the certifiers’ perception of the 
product’s content quality. (3) Publishers who have built-up either very strong or very 
weak reputational resources with respect to stylistic content innovation within a 
technological innovation-averse certification scheme are more likely than those with 
average reputations to be receptive to technological innovations. (4) The more resources 
firms operating within a technological innovation-averse certification scheme have built 
up with respect to direct customer contact, the less dependent they are on certifiers, and 
therefore the more receptive they are for technological innovations affecting their 
production and distribution channel. (5) The introduction of a technological innovation 
visible in the form of a media product is more likely to be successful if it is presented 
with content which is already well-established in the media content industry, rather than 
with innovative contents.  
Bomsel (2011) 
In this article, the author analyses a number of characteristics of media goods that are 
affected by the expansion of digital distribution although they are related to the meaning 
of media. These factors can result in permanent competitive advantages of certain media 
goods with respect to others, independently of the meaningfulness of the content. 
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Among these factors the author includes well-known issues such as copyright 
regulation, riskiness of experience good and the complexity of bundling and pricing 
choices in a context with multi-version substitutable products and multi-distribution 
channels. However, an original aspect added in this paper is fragmentation along 
linguistic and cultural borders. The level of fragmentation varies slightly among 
countries. For instance, the European media industry is highly fragmented both from a 
language and a cultural point of view. Moreover, the patchwork of different media 
markets in Europe is the result of diverging consumer preferences and varying 
technological, economic and regulatory circumstances across the EU. The thesis of the 
article is that this high fragmentation may result in a permanent competitive 
disadvantage in a context of expanding digitization of media distribution, unless 
specific regulation policies are implemented. To support this reasoning, the author 
shows that multilingualism not only adds specific costs to all media distribution 
systems, but it also prevents economies of scale in producing or marketing the media 
across Europe. Such fundamentals explain why multi-territory licensing is counter-
productive for media creation. The organisation of media industries in Europe is 
specific to the national regulation of each Member State, but is now being challenged by 
the rollout of new media markets. Digital networks do not capture all the value of the 
media, but have to get inserted in their complex and path-dependent multi-version 
discrimination schemes. Consequently each member state has built up specific media 
regulations aiming at shaping discrimination schemes compatible with its national goals 
of media creation and diversity. The problem is that these regulations are complicated to 
harmonize, especially because of multilinguism. In fact, media goods provide a 
meaningful experiences that generates cultural paths affecting their relative value within 
the different cultural communities. Therefore, both creation and distribution are highly 
sensitive to linguistic and cultural parameters. Moreover, media industries are capital 
intensive both for producing and marketing. This means that large linguistic markets, 
such as the United States, have a structural competitive advantage. On the other hand, 
European media industries carry high discrimination costs: the investments required for 
shaping consumers' utility for a product or service, are comparably higher and riskier 
than in larger linguistic markets. This penalise creation, diversity, and curtail potential 
economies of scope. In the author’s view, the key factors are thus discrimination costs. 
Having them low allows efficient media distribution, which increases returns on 
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creation of new products and new brands. The problem of the European media industry 
is that linguistic segmentation increases these costs incentivising the protection of 
national media sector with idiosyncratic rules. In conclusion Europe suffers a lack of 
competitiveness compared to monolingual markets such as the United States or even 
China, both at the production, marketing and distribution level. The multiplicity of 
languages and cultures creates a wide distribution of individual preferences that requires 
expensive versioning that adds to the high discrimination costs created by the path-
dependency of each individual member state. On the other hand in big linguistic 
communities digitization can be exploited to improve discrimination efficiency in media 
distribution. As a consequence, digital distributors’ strategy focuses on benefitting from 
scale economies of a large monolingual markets on which the media discrimination 
systems are homogeneous. The problem faced by the European media industries is thus 
to avoid an excessive concentration in digitized distributions and harmonize media 
regulations in order to mitigate the competitive disadvantages deriving from 
multilinguism. 
 
4. Pricing 
 
The effects of digitization on pricing strategies have been largely studied by economist. 
The main feature of bit encoding is the reduction of traditional costs in production and 
transactions, which have resulted in a general trend of price reduction in many 
industries. In the media industry, the effects are even stronger since additional economic 
constraints such as space limitation (on the support), copying capacity and logistic are 
relaxed in a digitized supply chain. Relaxation of constraint means enhanced versioning 
and discrimination opportunities for publishers and authors. On the other hand, 
consumers may not have the same preferences’ structure for the same work consumed 
on different supports. As an example, despite new supports such as tablets are 
specifically designed to read text on it, most consumers still seem to have a higher 
willingness to pay for a physical book rather than a digital one. Even if this gap in 
evaluation may decrease in time proportionally to the diffusion and the adaptation to 
new supports, rational consumers may anticipate the reduction in costs for publishers 
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and maintain a lower willingness to pay for digital copies, putting pressure on prices. 
Gap in pricing may also increase if pirated contents increase their diffusion. In addition 
to that, distributors’ fees and taxation may reduce margins on digital sales to the point 
of exceeding the saves in costs. Last but not least, marketing strategies in a supply chain 
with multichannel distribution should address the problems of cannibalization and 
freeriding which may emerge if distribution is not vertically integrated. 
 
4.1. Enhanced opportunities for versioning and bundling  
 
Bakos and Brynjolfsson (2000) 
In this paper the authors show that, when the marginal costs are very low, bundling can 
create economies of aggregation for information goods even in the absence of network 
externalities or economies of scale or scope. These economies have important 
competitive implications for the digital market. The first is that when competing for 
upstream content, larger bundlers are able to outbid smaller ones. On the other hand 
when competing for consumers, bundling practices may be used to discourage entry 
even when potential entrants have a superior cost structure or quality. Conversely, by 
adding contents to a bundle, a firm may be able to profitably enter a new market and 
even dislodge incumbents who do not bundle. Finally, since large bundlers are able to 
capture larger shares of the market, single brand firms may have lower incentives to 
innovate and create such markets. Following their previous studies on the benefits of 
bundling large numbers of information goods, in which they found that the critical 
variables are the low marginal costs and the correlations in valuations for the goods 
(namely aggregation is less attractive when valuations are highly correlated), the authors 
use a set up with a single seller providing n information goods to a set of consumers. 
Each consumer can either demand 1 or 0 units of each good and resale not permitted. 
Valuations for each good are heterogeneous among consumers and they depend on the 
number of good purchased. If (1) the marginal cost of copies of all goods is zero for all 
information goods, (2) for all n consumer valuations are independent and uniformly 
bounded, with continuous density functions, non-negative support and given mean and 
68 
 
variance and (3) consumers have free-disposal, then the authors show that selling a 
bundle of n goods can be superior to selling the goods separately, since the deadweight 
loss per good and consumers’ surplus converges to zero as n increases, maximizing 
firm’s profits. Assume that there is competition in the market (two firms with given 
endowments and non-overlapping goods), that consumers’ valuations are i.i.d. and that 
there is one good (call it n) left which is not in the endowments. Initially, firms bid for 
good n in the first period, but they can bid for an exclusive license or a non-exclusive 
one. Subsequently, both firms decide whether to offer their goods to consumers 
individually or in a bundle (no mixed bundles allowed) and finally they set prices. The 
authors show that in this setting, if the bundles are large enough, it is more profitable to 
add the outside good to the larger bundle. This implies that the largest bundlers in the 
market will tend to grow further relatively to other firms that compete in the upstream 
market. The availability of contents is very similar to traditional economies of scale. 
Thus distributors with enough initial funding can get a competitive advantage by adding 
a large number of contents on their platform. Finally, if there exists substitutes products 
in the market, bundling is a dominant strategy since it allows to gain a competitive 
advantage both on producers of single good and to firms selling substitute goods 
separately. Moreover, a bundler of a large number of goods can increase his profits on 
all goods he his selling by adding a new good to the bundle, even if this good is a partial 
substitute of a good already included in the bundle. Another consequence of these 
results is that a large bundler obtain a relevant market power and can use bundling to 
strategically deter small potential entrants from entering the market or to force single-
product firms out of the market, even if it would not be able to do so offering a 
substitute product. This last result can be applied to digital media industry in these 
terms: a large distributor can deter entrance or force out of the market a single brand 
even if the latter has a higher market share or diffusion with respect to the substitute 
brands available in the bundler portfolio. This risk must be considered by publishers 
while setting up digital strategies. Naturally, other tools such as versioning or changes 
in goods can be used to mitigate these effects. 
Venkatesh & Chatterjee (2006) 
In this paper the authors analyse the product market conditions under which a publisher 
should start offering online contents. Moreover, they discuss optimal online marketing 
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mixes (bundle, unbundled contents, or both). Finally, they address pricing implications 
and they find that going online is profit enhancing even when the market strongly 
prefers the traditional medium and there are no advertising revenues. Differently from 
the previous paper, they nevertheless find that under specific market conditions the 
online modules, rather than the bundle, better complements the print bundle. The 
authors start their set up building on three considerations. First of all, in the case of 
multiform products, consumers’ reservation prices depend not only on their valuation of 
the content but also on their preferences for the different supports (i.e. tablets, 
smartphone, PC, hardcopy). Moreover, with multiform products the range of options is 
expanded beyond pure components, pure bundling, and mixed bundling . For example, 
the print magazine and its bit-encoded version are two distinct bundles and offering 
them both is arguably neither pure bundling nor mixed bundling. Finally, subscription 
and advertising revenues gaps related to the support (when applicable) must be included 
in the decision concerning digital strategies. The authors find out that it is profitable for 
publishers to go online even when consumers strongly prefer the traditional support. 
Moreover, in their view the optimal strategy is to offer initially only online modules in 
addition to the print version; the bundle should be added to the product line only when 
the market is more accepting of the digital versions. Moreover, they found that low 
priced versions should be targeted at consumers with low valuation for the content. 
Finally, the optimum price of the hardcopy is influenced by the presence of online 
offerings. It decreases initially as the market’s acceptance of digital versions grows, but 
increases subsequently. The model set-up starts with a monopolist publisher who is to 
decide which products to offer and at what prices to maximize profit. Potential revenue 
sources are hardcopy and/or online subscribers and advertisers. Advertising revenues 
are medium specific and increase proportionately with diffusion of that version. The 
market consists of surplus-maximizing consumers who value one or more of the 
modules of the magazine. Consumers are heterogeneous in their (1) preference for 
contents and (2) preference for support. The latter is driven by magazine-specific and 
consumer-specific factors. In terms of its content, we stylize the print magazine as a 
bundle of two modules. A consumer’s valuation of a module in hardcopy form is 
captured by her reservation price for each module. The authors assume consumer’s 
reservation price for the bundle is additive and that distribution of evaluations across 
consumers is iid uniform in the interval [0, 1]. A consumer’s preference for digital to 
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hardcopy is given by the ratio of reservation prices denoted γ, distributed uniformly in 
the interval [0, γmax]. Using this web preference and print and online advertising 
revenue as exogenous product-market parameters, the authors find out all the above 
mentioned results.  
Jeon and Menicucci (2006) 
In this paper, the authors analyse publishers’’ incentives to practice bundling, the 
ensuing effects on social welfare as well as implications for merger analysis, through 
the case of academic publishing. They consider a mature stage of e-journals in which 
publishers practice price discrimination based on usage, assuming heterogeneity among 
libraries and building a model in which each publisher offers a set of journals to a 
library which wants to build a portfolio of journals and monographs. Their model 
analyses how bundling affects journal pricing through its impact on the library’s 
allocation of budget between journals and books under a budget constraint. Consider 
independent pricing (i.e. no-bundling) the authors find that industry concentration does 
not affect prices. In the general case of heterogeneous journals, they show that there is a 
unique equilibrium candidate regardless of the level of industry concentration and that 
the equilibrium always exists both under the maximum concentration (i.e. the monopoly 
case) and under the minimum concentration in which each publisher sells only one 
journal. Moreover they find that when bundling is allowed each publisher has an 
incentive to bundle all his journals. They identify two effects of bundling: 
1. Bundling has the direct effect of softening competition from books.  
2. Bundling has the indirect effect of generating negative pecuniary externalities 
for all other publishers. 
Therefore, bundling is a profitable and credible strategy: it increases the publisher’s 
profit and decreases the profits of rivals. The direct and indirect effects of bundling 
suggest that any merger increases the merging publishers’ profits because of the direct 
effect while reducing rivals’ profits because of the indirect effect. Moreover, bundling 
(or any merger) increases industry profits. However, the authors conclude that bundling 
decreases social welfare and that any merger among active publishers reduces social 
welfare as well. Moreover, they examine publishers’ incentive to acquire a journal from 
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a third-party, finding that in the absence of bundling all publishers has the same 
willingness to pay for the journal, while under bundling the largest publisher has the 
highest willingness to pay. This suggests that bundling might affect industry dynamics 
increasing the market power of the largest publishers and forcing small publishers out of 
the market. The paper overcomes the conventional idea that bundling has no effect 
when sellers have complete information on the buyer’s valuation for each product and 
there is no interdependency among valuations of different products, showing that when 
the budget constraint is binding, each firm has a strict incentive to adopt bundling. The 
paper suggest that there is a strong conflict between private and social incentives in the 
bundling of e-journals; each publisher wants to bundle his journals and bundling in-
creases industry profits but reduces social welfare. Moreover, they found that bundling 
creates incentives for mergers, but this again reduces social welfare by reducing book 
and journal consumption. However, mergers among publishers who would not be able 
to sell their journals because of their lack of size might increase social welfare. Finally, 
in the authors’ view, bundling can have a serious impact on the evolution of industry 
concentration by affecting the incentives to acquire other journals. While in the absence 
of bundling each publisher has the same willingness to pay for a journal, under bundling 
the largest publisher has always the highest willingness to pay. Hence, bundling might 
create a vicious cycle through which big publishers induce the exit of small publishers 
and become even bigger by purchasing their titles. This article has demonstrated how 
powerful bundling is in a context of with a large number of copyrighted goods. 
However, because of the specific characteristic of the academic publishing industry, the 
authors have been able to disregard two elements that are crucial for the analysis of the 
publishing industry and may overrule some of the results when you consider the 
industry as a whole, namely the effects of multi-channel distribution on the value chain 
and the effects of digitization on the advertising dynamics in the industry. 
Koukova, Kannan & Ratchford (2008) 
In this article the authors investigate the problem of product form bundling, defined as 
marketing two or more versions of the same product, available on different supports, as 
a bundle. This is a general problem in the media industry since differentiation of 
contents among versions is usually limited, especially for industries such as book 
publishing were the work is one well defined written text which can be hardly 
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differentiated. The media inherent substitutability may consistently limit the 
attractiveness for consumers of acquiring more than one version. On the other hand, the 
author outline that digital and physical formats may provide different type of utilities 
connected with specific usage situations. Using experimental manipulation by providing 
consumers with communications that emphasize differentiation in usage functions, the 
authors find that for book and newspaper subscription categories, this manipulation do 
significantly increase intent to purchase more than one version of the content, as long as 
the bundle is discounted. The authors start from the intuition that bundles of information 
goods differ from bundles of physical goods. Information bundles tend to have very low 
marginal cost of producing digital versions in addition to print and the individual 
versions may be redundant, since after experiencing a content, such as an online book, 
consumers do not benefit in the same way from the hardcopy to read the same content. 
On the other hand, conventional bundles generally have positive marginal costs and are 
not redundant. In their experiment they test four hypotheses: (1) when presented with 
advertising messages emphasizing different usage situations, consumers will be more 
likely to choose the bundle as compared to when presented with stimuli emphasizing the 
same usage situations for the product forms. (2) The likelihood of buying the 
information product bundle is low if there is no bundle discount. If there is a bundle 
discount, then the likelihood of buying the bundle will be significantly higher if 
awareness of different usage utilities is high than if it is low. (3) Consumers of 
information goods will be less likely to purchase a bundle consisting of different 
versions than consumers of conventional goods for all discount levels and usage 
situations. (4) Consumers will be more likely to choose the product form bundle when 
the hardcopy is priced at a premium and the electronic product is discounted as 
compared to when both forms are equally priced. As for the methodology used in the 
experiments, they confirm the relationship between perceived product form 
complementarity and bundle choice by varying bundle discount and product category 
type between-subjects and manipulating awareness of usage situations creating 
perceptions of either low or high complementarity between the alternative versions, 
using a panel of 406 undergraduate students. The implications of these results for the 
industry are various: first, there may be potential gains increasing consumers’ awareness 
of differences in terms of usage functions of digital versions. However, when different 
versions are not perceived as having a relative advantage in different situations, the 
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cannibalization among versions is large and it cannot be mitigated by discounting the 
additional version. On the other hand, when different versions are perceived to have an 
advantage in different situations, a mixed bundling strategy with a discount for buying 
the second item is superior to pricing only the individual items. 
Parker & Alstyne (2000) 
This article models the possible benefits arising for firms in the digital market even if 
they have to concede contents for free. The intuition is that free strategic complements 
can raise a firm’s own profits while free strategic substitutes can lower profits for 
competitors. The author uses a model of cross-market externalities based on network 
effects, price discrimination and product differentiation that shows how the 
characteristics of digital media market may lead to novel strategies such as eagerness to 
enter into Bertrand price competition. The three main results are: (1) a firm can 
rationally invest in a product it intends to give away into perpetuity even in the absence 
of competition. (2) Markets for content-providers and end-consumers can both be a 
candidate for free good. (3) A firm can use strategic product design to penetrate a 
market that becomes competitive post-entry. This model is adapted to a number of 
digital industries but it does not seem to be adaptable to digital media industry for three 
main reasons that we have outlined in previous section. On the one side, the 
procurement model of content creation is peculiar, since it entails high risks and 
involves authors who are themselves publishing brands with different evaluations. 
Moreover, the products are hardly substitutable, since they are unique by definition. 
Another critical issue is the size of the market. While digital distributors have the 
critical mass of users required to apply this type of strategy, which they do putting 
pressure on editors’ margins, the latter have a cost structure which does not allow for 
the same economies of aggregation. This is mainly due to the existence, for many of 
them, of a traditional brick and mortar distribution channel, which is strictly connected 
with the publishing protocols, from the demonstration to the creation of demand for 
media products, and cannot be dismantled without a long and costly transition. The third 
problem is that under the current product market condition the margins in the digital 
market are not sufficient to support the author’s hypothesis for which by raising digital 
demand the profits of the firm will grow. This is due to variables such as network 
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diffusion, cannibalization, taxation and competitive environment in the digital 
distribution, which may exceed the benefits in terms of cost saving for media firms. 
 
4.2. Marketing of digital media: cannibalization and freeriding issues 
 
Sundarajan (2003) 
The article analyses optimal pricing strategies for copyrighted goods and technological 
deterrence levels in a market with digital piracy. The firm’s optimal pricing schedule is 
characterized as a combination of the zero-piracy pricing schedule and a piracy-
indifferent pricing schedule, which makes all customers indifferent between legal 
consumption and piracy. Other results of the paper include the fact that while increases 
in piracy reduce prices and profits, on the other hand may improve welfare by 
expanding the ratio and volume of legal uses. Moreover, the author shows that in the 
absence of price-discrimination, the optimal level of technology-based protection 
against piracy is shown to be the technologically-maximal level, which maximizes the 
difference between the quality of the legal and pirated goods. However, when a seller 
can price-discriminate, it is always optimal to choose a strictly lower level of 
technology-based protection. Moreover, if a DRM  system weakens over time, due to its 
technology being progressively hacked, the optimal strategic response may involve 
either increasing or decreasing the level of technology-based protection and the 
corresponding prices. This direction of change is related to whether the technology 
implementing each marginal reduction in piracy is increasingly less or more vulnerable 
to hacking. The model used by the author to analyse technological protection of 
copyright builds on the commonly used notion of pirated good as an inferior (vertically 
differentiated) substitute for the legal good. The model generalizes the pricing analysis 
significantly, deriving a continuous pricing schedule which explicitly takes into account 
the differing value of pirated products to different customers. The model involves an 
information good which may be used by consumers in continuously varying quantities. 
The firm selling this legal good is a monopolist, by virtue of owning a copyright. Fixed 
costs of production or IP protection are assumed to be sunk while variable costs of 
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production are zero. In addition to the legal good, there is a pirated good, which is a 
lower-quality substitute and is free. Customers are heterogeneous, indexed by type. The 
preferences of a customer of a given type for the legal good are represented by a utility 
function depending on the quantity of the legal good used by the customer, and on a 
measure of the quality of the legal good. The problem with this study is, once again, that 
it does not consider the negative externalities that may occur by reducing the price of a 
good, when a substitute distributive channel with higher margins exists. Moreover, the 
hypothesis that the illegal good is lower in quality is adapted to a number of media 
industries such as movies and music for instance but it is not adapted to many others. In 
particular, this hypothesis is likely not to apply to publishing (particularly for segments 
such as news or academic articles). Moreover, the article does not consider the effect of 
advertising which may mitigate negative externalities in some segments if illegal 
diffusion can be quantified and embedded in remuneration.  
Evans (2009) 
In this essay, the author presents the characteristics and evolution of the digital 
advertising business as well as future scenarios from which we can derive the effects on 
business models of multichannel distribution industries. He explores some of the key 
developments such as behavioural targeting for matching advertising messages to 
consumers and economic aspects of the privacy issues that these technologies arise. The 
differences between digital and traditional advertising result from a combination of 
technologies and the nature of the web. The structure of online communications makes 
it easy for publishers and ad networks to learn considerably more about consumers than 
has been possible with traditional media. Digitized brands typically know from the 
internet technologies that an individual is viewing their site and this is very different 
from a radio station or a newspaper, which have limited ability to determine whether a 
particular individual is listening or reading. Digitized media can learn valuable details 
about the anonymous individuals that visit their site. In addition, websites with 
subscribers may have detailed information on registered users which they can also use 
for advertising. Print, radio and television media generally do not know this level of 
information for individual users. Advertisers and their intermediaries have no way of 
knowing whether an individual can hear or see their advertisements in the analogic 
world. For example, readers may not necessarily look at particular newspaper or 
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magazine page with advertising. On the other hand, online they can register with great 
confidence what content a consumer is viewing at a particular point in time. 
Advertisements can thus be targeted with a higher precision. Moreover, technology 
allows for making real time decisions on the ad to insert in a particular space. These and 
other features make online advertising a more efficient matchmaking vehicle for 
advertisers and viewers than offline advertising. From this reasoning, the author 
observes that there are economic incentives for advertising and viewing to move online. 
From a supply side, there are three main sources of supply of online advertising 
inventory, each of which results in different methods for selling advertising. (1) Search 
engines: on these sites advertisers bid on a cost-per-click for slots on search results page 
and the search provider allocates the slots on the basis of expected revenues it will 
receive (cost-per-click times expected clicks). (2) Online media sites: they provide 
content that is broadly similar to what consumers get from traditional media. These sites 
allocate portions of their pages to advertisements much like newspaper pages do . They 
generally sell the ads on a cost-per-mille basis—that is, based on how many eyeballs see 
their pages—through their own sales team and through advertising networks. (3) Social 
Networks: these sites and on-line advertising businesses are still looking for advertising 
methods that work more effectively with the types of interactions occurring on social 
networking communities.  Whether social networking sites can achieve cost-per-mille 
payments for their viewers that are comparable to other types of on-line advertising 
remains to be seen, as it has been clear with the case of Facebook IPO, which was locate 
to the stock exchange at a price embedding future revenues that are subject to this 
uncertainty. Following the author, however, it appears likely that online advertising will 
provide two potentially significant economic efficiencies. First, online advertising 
allows the economy to reduce the amount of resources devoted to creating content for 
aggregating and sorting potential buyers. Second, online advertising likely increases the 
accuracy of the match between the buyer and the seller. In both cases there are some 
drawbacks that also need to be considered, the most evident being freeriding risk and 
privacy concerns. Traditional advertising sustains a complex ecosystem of businesses. 
A wide range of media entities earn significant portions of their revenues from the sale 
of advertising inventory. In turn, these businesses support a variety of content 
generation businesses. Moreover, diverse other businesses or agencies work around 
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advertisers. Online advertising methods pose a serious threat to traditional methods; 
they increase the efficiency of matching buyers and sellers and delivering advertising 
messages to the buyers, this way reducing the economic importance of traditional 
intermediaries in the long term. Moreover, they increase the supply of advertising 
inventory significantly, putting pressure on margins. Finally, online advertising 
increases the supply of online content which provides a substitute for traditional 
content. In the author’s view, The industrial structure of the online advertising industry 
could evolve either with a highly concentrated set of intermediaries at its center, with 
many content providers around this core or with many intermediaries at its centre, with 
some intermediaries focusing on mass advertising and others focusing on niches. The 
ultimate structure depends on the relative importance of several factors: the strength of 
indirect network effects and scale economies on one side, the possible benefits of 
specialization of knowledge in certain areas on the other side. The most controversial 
issue about online advertising is the use of personal data for targeted advertising. If 
people had ownership over information about themselves, and there was a competitive 
market for it, they could decide whether to sell it to an online advertising business. 
However, consumers have limited control over their private information on the digitized 
networks. For example a user can choose not to use websites that insert “cookies” that 
collect data on her machine, but most of internet users are not sufficiently web-savvy to 
discern among websites. Web browsers have increasingly provided mechanisms for 
consumers to control the retention of information on their browsing history and manage 
their cookies, but even the most sophisticated one is still largely insufficient to protect a 
user’s privacy effectively. Another crucial issue is that consumers may agree to provide 
private information without anticipating that this information would be sold to other 
vendors who might combine it with other information about them. Solving the privacy 
problem should be one of the priorities of policy makers to set up a level playground for 
advertisers and consumers in the digital era. In order to do that, the complex social 
issues associated should be analysed thoroughly. 
Kirchoff (2009) 
Kirchoff presents the issues emerging for policymakers as the advertising industry face 
structural shifts, caused by consumers relying on the Internet and other digital platforms 
for news, entertainment, and socializing. Regulation in advertising follows the 
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principles of ensuring fair competition, shielding consumers from unfair or misleading 
messages, limiting the exposure of children, and restricting promotion of products such 
as tobacco and liquor deemed morally or physically harmful. Federal oversight of the 
advertising industry is intensifying as regulators and lawmakers try to keep pace with 
shifting technology and consumer habits, but recently the key issue has been the state of 
the newspaper industry, which is in financial distress due to eroding ad revenues. One 
emerging problem is that the online market is compressed. Under “search” business 
model, an advertiser bids, via an on-going auction process, to have his or her ad 
displayed when a consumer types a query into a search engine using a given keyword. 
The search market is dominated by Google and Yahoo. At the same time, the 
proliferation of ad-supported websites, online videos, blogs, and other offerings has 
created more supply, lowering advertising rates in both online and in conventional 
media markets. Media companies are struggling to craft new business strategies; they 
are investing in developing extensive online operations as customers move to the web. 
Some media firms now have online properties that pull in millions of consumers each 
month, but revenues have not grown in proportion to the digital audience, reducing the 
margins. One of the reasons is that many publishers chose to offer content for free 
online, under the theory they would generate higher advertising revenues by increasing 
their consumer base. Another factor is proliferation of websites, which has pushed down 
the price for some types of ads . On the other hand, media companies are taking on 
some of the functions of marketing and advertising firms as they reposition themselves. 
In this scenario, regulators and lawmakers are trying to keep up with an emerging world 
in which advertising is becoming both more pervasive and more difficult to distinguish 
from other content. On the other hand, the advertising industry is trying to ward off new 
regulation, saying it has moved aggressively with self-regulation, including its recent 
guidelines on behavioural advertising and that digital commerce is vital to the nation’s 
overall well-being. Whatever the outcome of the current initiatives, dramatic changes in 
the delivery of news, entertainment, and advertising are likely to continue, creating 
complex questions for lawmakers and regulators regarding consumer privacy, 
competition, and free speech. Media and cultural critic Marshall McLuhan in the 1960s 
argued that each new medium has its own intrinsic effect, changing the nature of society 
and commerce. Four decades later, technological advances are forcing media companies 
and advertisers to refine and reshape their messages to reach consumers in new venues, 
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from mobile phones to handheld readers to online gaming networks. The developing 
forms of communication are, in turn, influencing the content of advertising as 
companies attempt to become part of the conversation on social networks or part of the 
landscape by embedding products in news and entertainment programming. Consumers 
must figure out how to determine the value and veracity of advertising and media, as 
regulators determine how to craft a workable oversight system that stretches beyond 
advertising on traditional media, to the rapidly expanding digital world. 
de’ Grassi (2011)  
The switch from “traditional publishing” to a “digital publishing”, which separates the 
concepts of meaningful expression from the support allowing for publishing, has been 
accelerated by the introduction on the market of new supports, technologic innovations 
allowing for comfortable exploitation of digitized contents. The emerging trends have 
imposed a rethinking of media industries’ business models. In this article I have 
analysed the key economic issues emerging for magazine publishers facing digitization. 
Then I outline the key strategic trade-offs and set a simulation model, embedding the 
peculiarities of digital media market and testing the available strategies on the 
distribution side of the supply chain. Digitization relaxes traditional constraints of the 
media industry such as space, copying and logistic issues and multiplies strategic 
options available to publishers through enhanced discrimination tools: (1) New 
versioning and bundling opportunities and (2) new avenues for conducting business, 
including the possibility of directly distributing contents. The model considers five 
strategies available to publishers and analyses how different publishing brands should 
choose among them. The pure strategies available are: (1) Not entering digital market, 
(2) Outsourcing digital distribution through licensing, (3) Setting up a directly owned 
digital retailing network. The latter option allow for a further decision on which 
marketing mix to offer through the new channel. This produces two more strategies: (4) 
distribute through digital retailer only a bundle composed of the paper version plus one 
or more digital versions. (5) Distribute both the bundle and the single versions 
independently. Publishing brands are heterogeneous in term of size and type of content; 
however, the attractiveness of digitized versions for each of them depends on three key 
variables: (1) the actual attractiveness of digital versions in terms of marginal costs, 
which result from the trade-off between savings on production and transport costs and 
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additional costs, such as digital distributor’s fees, differences in taxation and lower 
willingness to pay of consumers and advertisers. (2) The digital market share, which 
depends mainly on the diffusion of digital e-readers, on marketing investments and on 
the structure and regulation of the new competitive environment which will result from 
the confusion of audiences, temporalities and media products. (3)  The last factor is the 
algebraic sum of positive and negative externalities introduced in the industry by 
digitization. This factor will depend mainly on the degree of substitutability 
(cannibalization) of products and on the structure of intellectual property rights in the 
new framework. Al the above factors must then be confronted with the specific 
characteristics of a media brand in term of brand awareness, cost allocation in the 
traditional value chain, type of product, financial and organizational resources, etc. 
Choosing the most adapted strategy for serving the digital market is a matter of survival 
for many publishing brands and is an extremely complex decision. This article provides 
strategic guidelines for a firm to optimize his efforts toward digitization.  
 
Conclusions 
 
From the analysis of recent studies the first conclusion is that the continuous and rapid 
evolution of technologies, competitive scenarios and digital strategies, which 
characterize the development of the digital market for media, require more research to 
provide solutions for the various complex issues that are still under discussion. The first 
objective should be a regulation creating a level playground for the digital media 
market. In order to achieve this ambitious objective, research should provide solid 
economic evidence in support of the many policy initiatives which are emerging in the 
field of copyright, digital distribution or advertising. Moreover, research should focus 
not only on economic effects which are related to technologic innovations; on the other 
hand it should systematically include socio-economic questions that are rising since 
digitization affects also the core of media works, such as their meaning and their 
publishing protocols. The first question that needs to be addressed is the nature of 
digitized media. As today, in Europe, an e-book is comparable to an electronic licence 
for software; it is not considered a cultural good. This poses different economic 
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problems, such as whether the exhaustion principle applies or which level of VAT 
should be applied to them. A second relevant question is how to reengineer the 
mechanisms of remuneration for content creators. Despite lawmakers’ efforts, copyright 
by definition is not adapted to a market in which copies cannot be physically accounted 
for. This question cannot be properly answered without an in depth analysis of how 
digitization affect the creation and distribution of intellectual property rights. For 
example, who is the right’s owner of a Tweet? Is it the author or the platform or is it just 
common knowledge? How do we trace the new line dividing correspondence from 
publishing? The third and probably most debated question is the organization of digital 
distribution, the extent of the responsibility of intermediaries and their interaction with 
the physical distribution of the same contents. The fourth question is how to coordinate 
efficiently the policy objectives in the area of digital agenda and culture. In the last 
decade the objective of developing digital infrastructures has prevailed and the 
availability of a large amount of copyrighted goods for free has resulted in an indirect 
subsidy that has favoured this deployment. On the drawbacks, media industry as a 
whole has suffered from these policies while only specific sectors have been able to 
benefit from the larger potential market created with these subsidies. In particular, the 
language basins have been critical. While digitized media in English have gained larger 
market shares, others haven’t, since their potential market was capped by the dimension 
of their linguistic basin. In order to survive, media companies have concentrated their 
efforts on the most profitable products, but this may have a negative impact on cultural 
development and diversity, which may result in a long-term serious issue for Europe. 
Summing-up, it seems that Digital Agenda objectives have gone in contrast with 
Cultural objectives in the digital market. Positive externalities created by the 
deployment of new networks have compensated for this cultural slow-down until now 
but they are quickly reaching saturation and the negative impact on welfare of cultural 
pauperisation is becoming predominant. A new field of research is open on which 
strategies should be implemented in order to align these two objectives. 
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Chapter 2 
Subsidising Network Technology Adoption. The 
Case of Publishers and E-readers: is there a Need for 
Vertical Agreements?  
 
Abstract 
 
To market a new network technology effectively, manufacturers need to understand the 
structure and size of network effects associated with the product. If consumers’ surplus 
from adoption depends positively on the number of interconnections in the network, 
early adopters may need to be subsidized until a critical mass is reached. Moreover, in a 
two-sided market where platforms and complementary contents are constrained to non-
negative prices, subsidies can be provided both by platform manufacturers and by 
producers of complementary contents. The article presents a model to analyse adoption 
dynamics with different subsidies and different stand-alone values for technology. The 
model shows that if the stand-alone value of technology is limited, subsidies from 
complementary contents producers may be pivotal to reach the critical mass. Moreover, 
under given conditions, this type of subsidies can lead to a more efficient adoption, 
increasing social welfare. In this case, assuming a monopolist platform manufacturer of 
the technology, complete contracts are needed to reach the Pareto optimal equilibrium.   
 
Keywords: two-sided markets, network effects, technology adoption, copyright, vertical 
relations, media economics, publishing, e-books. 
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Introduction 
 
A network technology can be defined as a platform (of tools, machines, techniques, 
crafts, systems, methods of organization or environmental rearrangements) giving 
access to a number of interconnections embedding externalities (usually positive). 
Starting with the initial work of Rohlfs (1974), the literature has emphasized the role of 
externalities and the value of network interaction as determinants of technology 
adoption. Rohlfs’ model of interdependent demand defines consistent equilibrium user 
sets and finds multiple equilibria at any given price. He concludes that, if the initial 
disequilibrium is the null user set, early adopters need to be subsidized in order to reach 
a critical mass compatible with the start-up problem of the technology. Katz and 
Shapiro (1986) analyse the case of a new technology competing with an incumbent 
technology, they find that the determinant for adoption is the willingness from the 
manufacturer to make investments and promote the new technology. In the absence of 
subsidies, the incumbent technology has a competitive advantage due to his installed 
base of users. Many markets deriving from network technologies are two-sided; 
platform court two or more sides that use the technology to interact with each other. The 
value of the network technology depends on the two (or more) user sets, in a dynamic of 
indirect network externalities: it is the case of industries such as Media, software or 
credit cards. In these cases, as studied by Rochet and Tirole (2003), since demand in the 
two sides is interdependent, platforms can cross-subsidize between agents which take 
part in the transactions and producers of complementary contents can provide subsidies 
to technology adoption.  
Moreover, network technologies can slightly differ in their stand-alone value, which is 
defined here as the utility they bring to a given consumer when the set of 
interconnections available in the network is the null set. For example, a single telephone 
cannot provide any utility to any user without an associated set of interconnections. On 
the other hand, a technology such as PC started providing utility to many users before 
the associated network (the internet) was deployed. The recent introduction on the 
market of e-readers, the most known of which being I-Pad from Apple and Kindle from 
Amazon, is a case of particular interest. These devices are specially conceived to exploit 
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digitized written and visual media, increasing comfort, accessibility and portability of 
the e-books and other Medias. Many users may thus be interested in e-readers only if 
they can have access to their favourite Medias through the platform. Nevertheless, other 
users may allocate a positive stand-alone value to the technology: it is the case of 
“geeks”, which by definition have a high willingness to pay for every new information 
technology. It can be also the case for specific segments of the population which can be 
interested in some of the particular characteristics of these technologic devices (light 
weight, possibility of editing texts, touch screen, design, brand, etc.). 
The paper develops a theoretical model to investigate the dynamics of technology 
adoption with different stand-alone values. While there exists a wealth of literature that 
examine the role of stand-alone value and network value in technology adoption
4
, this 
paper focuses on efficient subsidy schemes and coordination problems arising from 
different type of network technologies and different installed bases. The model moves 
from the start-up problem described by Rohlfs (1974) in which a unit mass of 
consumers whit interdependent demand needs to choose whether to adopt a new 
technology, marketed by a monopolistic manufacturer. In the next session, we thus 
formulate a simple model in which the incremental utility of the service to an individual 
depends only on the number of adopters on the two sides of the market and not on who 
these adopters are. While the abovementioned models do not consider stand-alone 
value, following Tucker (2008) we consider that a group of user may adopt the 
technology because of utilities arising from local usage of the new technology. In her 
paper, as an example, she estimates the weight of stand-alone value in the adoption 
decision for a service of video messaging. Nevertheless, different technologies may lead 
do very different estimations. In our example, we could assume that I-Pad, providing a 
much broader range of utility, may have a positive stand-alone value for a larger share 
of the population while Kindle, which is conceived almost exclusively to read books, 
will have a lower one. 
In the paper, we thus consider the general case in which a given share of the population 
has a positive valuation for stand-alone technology, while the residual part of the 
population has a null valuation. Given this assumption, there exists a non-negative 
demand right after the introduction of the technology, before the network is deployed. 
                                                             
4 See for example Farrel and Saloner (1985) or Tucker (2008) 
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This demand determines an installed base for a given technology and modifies the start-
up problem for a network technology.  In some cases, the installed base can be 
sufficient to solve the start-up problem, leading to a high level of adoption equilibrium 
without any subsidy. Nevertheless, in many cases the installed base is limited and a 
subsidy scheme is needed to reach a more efficient equilibrium. In the model, two types 
of subsidies are considered: a penetration pricing scheme and an investment boosting 
the awareness or characteristics of the product. Moreover, both the manufacturer and the 
producers of complementary contents can provide these subsidies. The case of 
publishers and e-readers is again a good example. A manufacturer such as Apple or 
Amazon can provide subsidies by reducing the price of the platform or by investing to 
enhance product characteristics. While the first is a non-discriminatory subsidy, the 
second one may push more technophiles or brand fans towards adoption but it is not 
likely to impact the decision process of a consumer which is only interested in 
exploiting Media contents through his e-reader. On the other hand, a subsidy from a 
publishing company is likely to impact those consumers that are interested in the 
network of Medias connected to the platform.  
The model shows that when the stand-alone value is small, subsidies from 
complementary contents can be more efficient to solve the start-up problem. In these 
cases, a coordination problem emerges in the market. Assuming that platform 
manufacturer has a market power and other firms don’t, the manufacturer can adopt an 
opportunistic behaviour to free-ride on complementary contents subsidies and 
internalize all positive externalities. Anticipating this behaviour, companies will not 
invest to subsidize. Their optimal strategy is to wait until the technology is adopted by a 
sufficiently large share of the population, eventually free-riding on other firms’ 
investment. If this type of subsidies is pivotal to a successful start-up, the network 
technology may reach a suboptimal equilibrium due to underinvestment: not only 
consumers will obtain a lower surplus, since their utility increase with the size of the 
network, but they will pay a higher price for the technology.  
In such cases, vertical agreements leading to a complete contract between manufacturers 
and complementary contents producer can increase total welfare. This result, which may 
seem very controversial in the light of recent investigations from U.S. and E.U. Courts 
against Apple and many important publishers, was the basic principle leading to the 
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promotion of universal service adopted by these same institutions for other network 
technologies. As an example, subsidies to broadband diffusion (digital divide agenda) 
have been provided to telecom operators’ and internet service providers’ (ISP), which 
were in charge of the deployment of the network, both with financial aids and with a 
favourable regulation (ex. safe harbour). These distortions, which are now under 
discussion as well, introduced the problem of piracy and free-riding on media brands, 
but they did increase the value of broadband network for consumers, accelerating the 
adoption of the technology. The video game and DVD markets are further examples of 
successful start-ups of network technologies subsidized by publishers of complementary 
contents. Economists have shown that the availability of titles on this type of platform is 
crucial in determining the adopted standard among competitive platforms (Inceoglu, 
Park, 2009). The key difference in these cases is that the platforms are the only existing 
distribution channel for the complementary contents. Conversely, in our example books 
and Medias in general have alternative distribution channels they can exploit. Publishers 
may thus not accept to sell their products or subsidize technology adoption if they are 
not able to internalize sufficient externalities. 
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we set up a monopolistic network 
technology adoption framework. We then study the equilibrium users set with different 
stand-alone values. Section 3 introduces the subsidy schemes outlining the trade-off 
effects of different types of subsidies and the coordination problem. Section 4 concludes 
discussing results of the model and eventual policy insights.   
 
A Model for Network Technology Start-up Dynamics 
 
1. Interdependent Demand for a Network Technology 
 
Consider a population consisting of n individuals. As in Artle and Averous' and Rohlfs’ 
work, we define a set of binary variables:  
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(1) {
                                                           
                                                           
} for         
We assume there are M potential goods accessible in the network and P other goods in 
the economy, where good P is the platform giving access to the network. Since we are 
in a two sided market, we establish a linear relation between the fraction   
∑    
 
  of 
users adopting the network technology and the share   of network goods available 
through adoption: 
(2)         
Where: 
(3) {
                                                     
                                                     
}  for         
(4)   
∑    
 
 
To model interdependent demand, we specify a pair of additive utility functions for each 
individual:  
(5)   
   (           ) 
(6)   
   (           )      ∑             
Where:  
   
  is the utility of individual   if he does not subscribe to the network 
technology,  
   
  is the Utility of individual   if he does subscribe to network technology,  
     represents the consumption of good   by individual  , 
         is the incremental utility to individual   of the additional user  , which 
is dependent on the effect of the new user on the number of goods available in 
the network. 
91 
 
Equations (5) and (6) implicitly assume independent utilities with respect to all goods in 
the economy other than:  
1. The platform, 
2. The goods accessible through the network. 
In addition, we make the usual monotonicity assumptions: 
(7) 
   
 
    
             
(8)   
    
                                              
We also make two specialized assumptions, the first applicable to network technologies 
and the second applicable to two-sided markets: 
(9) 
   
 
   
      
(10) 
   
   
                                           
That is, a subscriber's utility never decreases as additional media goods become 
available in the network (and none drop out). In the same way, the number of media 
goods never decreases as additional users adopt technology (and none drop out). This is 
the logic usually defined as indirect network effect and seems like a sustainable 
assumption. In fact, it is hard to find an example of a network whose value would 
decrease if additional goods or services become available through it, or a market in 
which a higher demand leads to a reduction in the number of firms. It is maybe easier to 
think of a network technology becoming less valuable for a consumer as more users join 
it: it is the case for example of premium credit cards or exclusive clubs, in which the 
quality of service cannot be guaranteed beyond the optimal size of the set of users. 
However, as a rule, the increase of interconnections (user to goods or good to users) in a 
network technology is not detrimental to any party involved in the transactions. 
Since we have assumed (9) and (10), the adoption of technology from user   will not be 
detrimental   for any user     thus           . The additive model assumes that 
these incremental utilities do not depend on consumption of other goods outside the 
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network. This is a reasonable assumption for the purposes of this article although the 
deployment of a new network may certainly have an impact both on social and 
individual behaviour. To go back to our example, the adoption of e-readers has an effect 
on the consumption of books or other Medias through other distribution networks. This 
effect, which is of particular interest for the publishing industry, is not discussed in this 
article for the sake of simplicity but most of all because it is so complex that it needs a 
specific article on the subject.  
Every user is a rational consumer aiming at the maximization of his utility. The maxima 
  
  are defined by the ceteris paribus conditions and do not depend on the adoption of 
network technology. Maximizing equation (6) with respect to                , subject 
to individual i's budget constraint, we have: 
(11)  
 ̂     ̂      ∑                
Where      is the generic cost function for user   and                     . The 
condition for adoption will thus be: 
(12)   {
            ∑               
            ∑               
} 
Assuming a linear cost function           , we can reformulate (12) as: 
(13)   {
            ∑            
            ∑            
} 
Where     
   
  
 and      
   
  
     . To solve the model we need two more 
assumptions. The first one is that only a part of the population has a positive evaluation 
for the platform itself, what we defined in the introduction as the stand alone-value. The 
rest of the population derives utility only from the network accessible through the 
technology. We can write: 
(14)    {
    [     ̂]       
                               
} 
Where       with   [   ], and represents the share of “geeks” in the population. 
This assumption is reasonable in the light of the discussion developed in the 
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introduction and allows us to extend Rohlfs investigations by modelling different 
network technologies. Following this assumption, we can define different adoption 
conditions for the two types of consumer.  
(15)        {
           ̂        ∑            
           ̂        ∑            
} 
Where    is the price of the platform and   is the price of goods in the network, thus 
    is given by          . For all the other users, the adoption condition is: 
(16)        {
         ∑            
         ∑            
} 
The second assumption, following Artle and Averous and Rohlfs, is that only the size of 
the network, in term of users and goods, affects an individual's demand. This is a 
contestable approximation, since the quality of goods in the network does have an 
impact on demand, just like the relationships among users does affect the utility of each 
of them for a communication service. Nevertheless, some interesting results can be 
derived even considering the simple case in which all goods and all users affect the 
network in the same way. From now on, we thus assume uniform calling pattern, 
acknowledging that the relaxation of this hypothesis would be a very interesting field 
for further research. 
Let’s start analysing demand for “non-geeks” in the first place. Thank to uniform calling 
assumption, we can re-write equation (16) for the unit mass representing our total 
population: 
(17)   {
              
              
} 
Where        ∑         and   
∑    
 
 is the fraction of users adopting the 
technology that we have introduced at the beginning of the section. This allows ordering 
individuals in term of their demand for the service, since if           , user   will 
be an adopter in any equilibrium for which   is an adopter. Consider a technology where 
valuation     of the  
   consumer associated to the complete network is distributed 
uniformly over the population      [     ]. For the marginal consumer we have: 
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(18)                
The reserve price a “non-geek” consumer will be willing to pay to join the network 
when the latter is incomplete is proportional to the fraction of population which has 
subscribed to the network, since this determines the quantity of goods available in the 
network. We have denoted this fraction  , with   [   ].  The utility    of the  
    
consumer can thus be rewritten as: 
(19)   {
                                    
                                  
} 
The     consumer will buy the service if and only if his utility is higher than 0, the 
condition for adoption becomes: 
(20)          
The fraction of subscribers for a given price   will be equivalent to a scalar multiplied 
by the fraction   of consumers with an utility from adoption equal or higher than  . To 
simplify we will start assuming that in (29, coefficient      so that we can substitute 
      as in Rohlfs.  If    is the utility of the consumer for which   
     (indifferent consumer), since utility is uniformly distributed we have: 
(21)            
 
 
 
Substituting we have that demand is the locus of points where: 
(22)            
The combination of the hypothesis on uniform distribution and the proportionality 
between utility and the fraction of subscribers allows showing the fraction of the 
population that may adopt technology for any given price. 
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Fig.1 Demand for “non-geeks” users, as in Rohlfs’s Model (1974) 
 
The graph above visually shows the demand of “non-geeks” consumers. The black 
curve represent the valuation of consumers for the complete network, namely a network 
in which all consumers are connected and all goods are available in the network. The 
red parabola represents demand for the incomplete network. The intersections (if any) 
of the red curve with price identifies possible equilibria. Solving for f we have: 
(23)  [           ] 
(24)  
 
 
 √(  
  
   
)  
We thus have three possible outputs: 
 For      , we have a single equilibrium in     , the user set is null, 
 For      , we have multiple equilibria    ,   , depending on the starting 
disequilibrium, we end up either with a null user set or a user set including the 
entire population 
0 1 ƒ
p
ƒ low ƒ high
100
25
Ui Utility of fully deployed network
Local usage utility
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 For         multiple equilibria,            ,          with the 
equilibrium on the right-end side of the parabola       ) which is always pareto-
superior to the ones on the left-end side. 
If   is higher than the reserve price for the incomplete network, “non-geeks” consumers 
will not adopt technology in any case. If the price is below this threshold there will 
always be two possible outputs for non-geeks demand. The left-end equilibrium (    ), 
beside behind suboptimal, is an instable equilibrium: if a single consumer chooses to 
drop from the network, the utility of others consumers will progressively become lower 
than   bringing back the equilibrium to the null user set. On the other hand, if the level 
of deployment is higher than     , the utility for a newcomer will be higher than p and 
the roll-out will proceed further and will reach the point of equilibrium defined as      . 
This model shows the existence of a threshold, a critical mass of consumers which is 
necessary to solve the start-up problem of a network technology and generate the 
positive externalities.  
Proposition 1: If the starting disequilibrium for a network technology is the null user 
set and all consumers are non-geeks, for any maximizing price      , in order to reach 
the critical mass and solve the start-up problem, early adopters have to be subsidized. 
Proof: if      ,            
 , thus nobody is interested in adopting the 
technology, unless subsidies are provided. If       , we have that       
  
        [          ] but       
          [       ]  [        ], thus if the 
starting disequilibrium is      nobody will be interested in adopting technology. The 
share of population that needs subsidies to adopt technology, which we call  =    , 
while the amount of needed subsidies can be calculated as the area under the parabola:  
(25)     ∫       
    
 
 
 
2. Stand-alone Value and Geeks Demand  
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To learn more about adoption dynamics for network technologies we have to include in 
our model the demand from “geeks” users. We have assumed that a group of users has a 
positive valuation for the good defined as platform or device, which is essential to 
access the network technology. This category of consumers has two options to adopt, as 
described in (15). When the network user set is null, in the moment in which the 
technology is launched on the market      , he adopts if his valuation of the device is 
higher than the price of the device, namely     ̂     . If this is not the case, he can still 
adopt at a later stage       following the dynamics of adoption of “non-geeks” 
consumers. To simplify the strategic problem for “geeks” consumers, we further assume 
that a manufacturer cannot change the price of the device discriminating on the different 
groups of consumers. Moreover, we assume that demand for the device from geeks is 
less elastic than demand of “non-geeks” consumers. This seems a reasonable 
assumption since “geeks” users do not suffer any risk by adopting the technology, while 
for a “non-geeks” it exists the risk of receiving only the local utility from the device, for 
which he has a null valuation, or finding only a limited number of goods in the network, 
if a suboptimal equilibrium is reached.  
The demand curve of “geeks” (from now on referred to as   ) is defined as function of 
the share of “geeks” in the population    , the price of device        and of a parameter 
    which models the investment which can be allocated by a manufacturer to enhance 
the technologic characteristics or the awareness of the new device.  
(26)          =    [   ] 
Where: 
   
  
   
    
   
   
   
   
    
And  
(27) 
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An additional investment has a positive effect on the demand of geeks, but this effect 
decrease progressively since the share of “geek” in the population is not affected and 
thus the investment increase the utility of a progressively smaller share of the 
population. Moreover, investment in technology does not have any effect on “non-
geeks” consumers. This property can be observed in most new technologies, a typical 
example being the PC’s market. Many manufacturers kept investing in technology to 
increase the performances of their devices, but only a few consumers, the more 
technophiles, where actually impacted in their decision to adopt a new model or not. 
Most people decision to adopt a new model was driven by the appearance on the market 
of new programs, which required more advanced technology to run.  In the same way, 
when Apple invested to enhance the external aspect of their devices, which can be 
assimilated to a complementary content, the valuation of a large share of consumers was 
impacted, but not the one of “geeks”.  
Consider as an example a demand curve for “geeks” with a linear dependence on 
parameter   and a logarithmic dependence on parameter   . The choice of the function 
derives from the assumed lower elasticity to price of the “geeks”: 
(28)             (
 
   
)            
 
With      .This archetypal demand has two advantages: first of all we can visually 
depict it on the same graph that we used for “non-geeks” demand. Moreover its 
particular shape is helpful to visually show the effect of additional investment   on 
adoption dynamics.  
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Fig.2 demand curve for “the Geeks” 
 
Fig.2 introduces the demand function of “geeks”. If the share of “geeks” in the market 
increases, the curve will shift to the right, if the quantity of “geeks” decreases, it will 
shift to the left. An increase of parameter  , on the other hand, will change the shape of 
the curve, reducing elasticity to price of geeks and leading to higher demand for the 
technology. The existence of “geeks”, under given conditions, allow for a positive 
demand even starting with a null user set and with no subsidies available. To complete 
the definition of the problem, we need to define the dynamics of the technology 
adoption and to analyse the supply side. 
 
3. Maximization Problem for a Monopolistic Manufacturer 
 
i. Timeline with no subsidies 
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Fig.3 Timeline for network technology adoption with no subsidies 
The simplest timeline of the game starts with the manufacturer setting   , which is 
fixed for the two periods. Then at time      the geeks for which    ̂      adopt the 
technology, creating an installed-base of early adopters of size      . Publishers will 
observe   and decide on entry and set their optimal price   , determining    Then at 
    “non-geeks” decide on adoption. Fig.3 visually shows the timeline for adoption. 
 
ii. Manufacturer Profit function  
 
The manufacturer’s problem is to maximize his profits, which are given by the sum of 
profits in period 1 and discounted profits in period 2 which are a function of the 
installed base at    . The profit function can be written as:   
(29)                      
Where   is the discount factor and profits are given by: 
(30)              
(31)                   
The associated cost functions are simply: 
(32)                     
(33)                
(34)        
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Where   is the marginal cost of the device and    represents all fixed cost of the 
technology, which can be increased with further investment (   if subsidies are allowed. 
To complete the manufacturers market we have to set two conditions: the first one is a 
budget constraint, so that a manufacturer cannot keep increasing investment without a 
limit. We write this as        where   is the initial endowment of the firm. The 
second is a regularity condition:  
(35)                           
This means assuming that a successful adoption of technology by “non-geeks” users is 
always more profitable for a manufacturer than the simple maximization of profits on 
the “geeks” market. This assumption is reasonable in most cases, since positive 
externalities increase with the size of the network, nevertheless there may be some 
counterfactual examples, in which raising the price to prevent “non-geeks” users from 
adoption can be the optimal strategy. An example can be a premium credit card: in this 
case, a limited size of the network is essential to provide exclusive utilities to the 
adopters and thus a raise in price can lead to higher profits with respect to an increase in 
the number of adopters. The First Order Condition for the manufacturer is: 
(36)  
   
   
 
   
   
  
   
   
 
   
   
 
Therefore, if (35) holds, at     the manufacturer charges a lower price or sets a higher 
quantity than would maximize short-run profits, in order to raise its customer base and 
hence its future profits, whenever a successful adoption is feasible. 
 
iii. Equilibrium User Sets with Geeks in the Market  
 
In the absence of subsidies, the equilibrium user set at     is determined exclusively 
by the installed base of geeks obtained at      Equilibria for a given price   is given 
by: 
(37)   {
                           
                      
} 
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If          the installed base is lower than the critical mass, thus for every consumer 
  [        ] , we have that          , thus no more consumers are interested in 
adopting the technology and we end up in a stable equilibrium in which only “geeks” 
adopt the technology. If          the critical mass is reached and more users adopt 
technology until the stable equilibrium in      is reached, where          as 
described at the beginning of this session. Fig 4 illustrates this situation. The 
disequilibrium point   is located underneath the parabola. This implies that for some 
non-geek users   the network valuation is higher than is willingness to pay. User   thus 
adopts the technology further increasing the value of the network. Other users 
successively adopt technology until the stable equilibrium       is reached. 
 
Fig.4 Technology Adoption dynamics with high Stand-Alone Value 
Proposition 2: if               ,for a given network technology, the start-up 
problem is solved and there is one and only one stable equilibrium user set at    . 
Such equilibrium user set implies that a share       of the economy adopts the network 
technology and a share          does not adopt. 
Proof: if              is not a stable equilibrium.     [          ] we have 
that:               Thus all users in this set adopt the technology at    .  
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This situation captures a scenario in which the network technology has a very high 
Stand-Alone value and thus the population of “geeks” is predominant in the economy. 
This output is a first best solution both for the manufacturers, who maximize his profits 
and for consumers, since “geeks” will pay a lower price and “non-geeks” will obtain a 
larger surplus than in           . 
The necessary but not sufficient condition to obtain         at    , is to have a 
sufficient share of “geeks” in the economy, namely         If this condition does not 
hold, meaning that        and no subsidies can be provided except lowering the 
price,  optimal strategy for manufacturer may be to choose    in order to maximize   , 
since non-geeks will not adopt the technology unless the price is consistently reduced to 
      , as depicted in Fig5. The equilibrium user set will then depend on other 
variables such as the marginal cost of production  . If the price cannot be reduced below 
  the final equilibrium user set is in          . This captures the situation of a 
technology with low stand-alone value and underinvestment to subsidize early adopters 
or a technology for which the valuation of the device from “geeks” is very high while 
the valuation of the access to the network for “non-geeks” is low (Examples can be: 
Satellite phones or minidisc).  
 
Fig.5 Technology Adoption dynamics with low Stand-Alone Value 
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Proposition 3: for any given  , in the absence of subsidies, the maximum price 
compatible with the start-up problem, is   , defined as the price for which        
            =           . 
Proof: for any                , thus     [          ] we have that:         
      Thus all users in this set adopt the technology at    . Conversely, for any 
     ,        , thus     [         ],             , non-geeks users do 
not adopt at    . 
 
Dynamics of Network Technology Adoption with subsidies 
 
In this session we allow for additional types of subsidies from both the manufacturer 
and the producers of complementary contents and we analyse their effect on the 
adoption problem. First of all, let’s formulate the general scheme of needed subsidies. 
Proposition 5: Consider        , and assume that for “non-geeks” consumers the 
two good are perfect complements. For any   
  compatible with adoption, the share of 
population needing subsidies is at most            decreasing with the installed 
based. Moreover, for any      , the quantity of needed subsidies is lower than:  
∫         
    
 
5. 
Proof: if   (
 
   
)              then the share of population to subsidize is: 
         . If   (
 
   
)                      and no subsidies are needed. If 
    (
 
   
)                ,           Quantity of subsidies needed is 
given by: 
(38) ∫          
    
  
 
For any   , we thus have: 
                                                             
5 Quantity of subsidies calculated using Rohlfs (1974) model, starting from the null user set disequilibrium. 
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∫          
    
  
 ∫        
    
  
 ∫         
    
 
      
 
1. Subsidies from Manufacturer 
 
i. Timeline with Subsidies from Manufacturer 
 
In this section, we allow the manufacturer to provide subsidies not only by reducing 
price   but also by increasing investment  . 
 
Fig.6 Timeline of Adoption dynamics with manufacturer subsidies 
 
ii. Adoption Dynamics with Subsidies from Manufacturer 
 
Manufacturer can invest   at     in order to enhance technical characteristics or 
awareness of their technology. We have described this subsidy in the previous session. 
Recall that we assumed   is “device related”, it affects     ̂, thus it does not have 
significant impact on “non-geeks” , since they have    ̂   . On the other hand, 
subsidies from complementary contents’ producers are “Network related”, they will 
impacts    . This working assumption reflects the actuality of the launch of e-readers, 
characterized by two distinct marketing channels (device, device + Media) from the 
very beginning. Although scope economies may exist among the two channels, we 
consider that they have second order effects. 
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Manufacturers can provide subsidies also by reducing the price of device, as introduced 
above. A reduction in    will affect the whole market, since price is fixed in the two 
periods, it is an indiscriminate subsidy. The intuition is that an overinvestment effort in 
technology, by pushing more geeks towards the adoption of the new technology at 
   , can be more profitable than reducing   , since it is a discriminated subsidy. The 
condition for this strategy to be effective is that subsidy   is sufficient to solve the strat-
up problem.  The effect of an increase in investment is shown in Fig 7. Higher 
investment leads to an increase in the demand from geeks.    grows, nevertheless the 
share of “geeks”   in the population is not affected, nor is the utility of “non-geeks”. 
Recall also that the marginal effect of an overinvestment in technology of the hardware 
is decreasing as   increases. In our example, the problem for the manufacturer becomes: 
(39)             
(40) 
  
  
 
 
      
           
   
   
  
          
      
 
 
Fig.7 The effect of an increase in the investment effort 
The First order condition becomes: 
(41) 
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Proposition 6: Consider a technology for which        for the optimal price   
 . If 
manufacturer is allowed to provide infinite subsidies (   ), then the start-up problem 
can always be solved without reducing optimal price   
 . The Pareto-superior 
equilibrium in        can be reached thank to subsidy  . We say that   can be “pivotal” 
when       . 
Proof: If       , for every optimal   
    , we can have either        or    
    . If         holds, the start-up problem is solved and no subsidies are needed. If 
         the manufacturer can always set  
  such that     
       . This solves the 
start-up problem and it is always feasible if (   ). In fact, for    ,    
      
    , thus if       , the start-up problem can always be solved. 
This choice may also be Pareto-superior for the economy if from the maximization 
problem we have that  (         
  )      (    
  ). Otherwise, the manufacturer 
will have an incentive in non-investing. Technologic investment is progressively more 
costly and has an impact on a small share of consumers. Nevertheless, over-investing in 
technology can be justified if “geeks” consumers can be pivotal for adoption. By 
providing this type of subsidy, the manufacturer can fix a higher price and recover the 
cost of investment at      Manufacturer thus arbitrates between the two types of 
subsidies, choosing the combination that maximizes his profits.  
 
2. Subsidies from Complementary Contents Producers (CCP) 
 
In this section we first describe the CCP market, then we define the subsidies they can 
provide and we analyse their effect on adoption dynamics. 
i. CCP market 
Recall that the utility for a “non-geek” user is given by:  
(42)                   
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Where    is the price and  is the fraction of complementary contents in the market as 
defined in (4). CCP market is composed by a large number ( ) of identical companies 
    facing monopolistic competitions. Each company produces a single good which can 
be sold in the network associated with the new technology. There is free entry in the 
network, nevertheless in order to market a product the company suffers a positive cost 
of entry (which is technology specific and thus sunk), marginal costs are null: 
(43)                 
Each company maximizes profit in his share of the market: 
(44)                                
Since companies are identical and there is free entry in the market for every observed 
  we can define    as a Boolean variable taking value 1 if the company enters the 
market. We thus have: 
(45)  
  
 
 where  ∑       
And: 
(46)                          
(47)  
           
    
 
For every manufacturer’s choice, CCP market can end up in  two alternative stable 
equilibria: 
(48)     {
      
    
       non-geeks                  
      
    
                non-geeks              
} 
ii. Timeline with Subsidies from CCP – reduction of    
Let’s allow CCP to provide subsidies. For example they can reduce   . Subsidies from 
manufacturer occur after manufacturer has fixed his price. Non-geek users observe 
global price   and then decide on adoption. 
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Fig.8 Timeline of Adoption dynamics with CCP subsidies 
 
iii. Adoption Dynamics with Price Reduction from CCP 
In this session we assume        and    
    .This situation can arise from many 
different set-ups. For example, assuming     , the manufacturer cannot reduce the 
price of the device to    or he will have negative profits in both periods. Under these 
conditions, at    we have: 
(49)                   
     and       ∫            
    
  
 
Additional subsidies are needed to solve the start-up problem. Fig.9 visually shows this 
situation through our example. The blue dotted line depicts      while the red area 
represents     . 
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Fig.9 Additional Subsidies needed if        and    
     
Having identified the needed subsidies, let’s examine the impact CCP can have on 
adoption. Suppose that each CCP can make an investment    to subsidize adoption. In 
our case study of Publishers and e-readers, it can be an investment to create a more 
comfortable version rather than the PDF standard for written contents or to implement 
additional features to the existing Media (interactive links, archives, commentaries, 
etc.). We have assumed that this type of subsidy will only impact the valuation of the 
network. We can make a further assumption that this investment is not detrimental for 
any consumer, thus  
    
   
  .  
Let’s start analyzing CCP subsidies assuming 
    
   
  , thus complementary contents 
don’t increase the value of the network and CCP can provide subsidies only by reducing 
price of their goods.  
Proposition 8: if device and complementary contents are perfect complement, meaning 
“non-geeks” consumers only considering         making their adoption decision, 
then even assuming 
    
   
    CCP can provide subsidies to adoption. Moreover, these 
subsidies can be pivotal if  
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Proof: for any optimal couple (  
    
    we have: 
(50)     ∫          
    
  
 ∫     
       
    
  
 
Thus CCP can reduce   
    
 and reduce the amount of needed subsidies. In fact: 
(51)      
    ∫       
        
    
  
       
    
The maximum subsidy in this case is given by: 
(52) ∫          
    
  
 ∫     
       
    
  
 ∫       
       
       
  
 
If                    , then the quantity of needed subsidies is: 
(53)       ∫       
       
       
  
 
But then       [                ] CCP can set opportunely   
  such that       
    
    , thus solving the start-up problem. 
Now let’s assume 
    
   
  . CCP can increase valuation     by investing   . Each 
company can choose to invest or not: if they do, they suffer extra costs. In our example 
we treat    as a Boolean variable: 
(54) {
                             
                                      
} 
The extra fixed costs can then be introduced in the profit function as follows: 
(55)           (           )            
The effect of the subsidy is modeled as a linear increase in utility, depending on CCP 
decision. The new utility function can be written as: 
(56)                     
(57)  ∑
  
 
  
    
112 
 
Proposition 9: if 
    
   
  , the range in which CCP subsidies can be “pivotal” to 
network technology adoption is extended to                              , 
where:  
(58)               
           
(59)   
 
 
 √(  
  
        
)    
Proof: the maximum achievable subsidy is obtained for    , namely all companies 
that enter in the market invest to provide subsidy. Since all companies are identical, this 
is also the only positive subsidy reachable at equilibrium, the other possible equilibrium 
being    . If a positive subsidy is deployed, since  
  
  
  , 
         
  
  , 
         will shift to the left as depicted in Fig.10 to reach  
 
   
    . Moreover,     
increase to   
 =          (    )    . As a result, the needed subsidy is reduced 
from the blue area to the red area. Analytically: 
(60)      ∫        
   
         
     
  
 ∫          
        
     
  
 
For every       [                 ] we can thus find the minimum value of    that 
guarantees a successful deployment by setting: 
(61)            
(62)  (
 
 
)               
 
 
 √(  
  
        
) 
And solving for  . 
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Fig.10 Additional Subsidies needed if 
    
   
   
This type of subsidy, besides extending the set-ups in which it is possible to solve the 
start-up problem, can lead to a Pareto-superior final equilibrium where a larger share of 
consumers adopt the network technology and receive a higher surplus, while 
manufacturer obtains higher profits from the solution of the start-up problem (from the 
regularity condition).  
 
3. Hold-up, Free-riding and Coordination Problems 
 
CCP can provide subsidy only if they are compensated so that non negative profits 
constraint is satisfied. In fact, in the absence of coordination, investing is risky for CCP 
both because of horizontal and vertical information asymmetries. Each CCP controls a 
fraction 
  
 
 of the investment, so they do not have a priori guarantees that the need 
optimal investment    would be reached. Moreover, if manufacturer cannot commit on 
fixing the price for the device, they suffer a hold-up risk (recall that we assumed 
investment    is technology specific).  For a CCP the profit function becomes: 
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(63)             
          
                      
Thus for the company to be able to invest the condition becomes: 
(64)      (    
      )          
               
The intuition is that this condition can be fulfilled only if the manufacturer commits on 
keeping a fixed price for the device and remunerates CCP willing to invest for their 
subsidies. We can thus examine two possible scenarios: 
i. Manufacturer can establish complete contracts with CCP  
ii. Incomplete contracts: hold-up and free-riding risk emerge for CCP  
 
i. Timeline with complete contracts 
The possibility of structuring complete contracts can be modelled similarly to vertical 
integration. After signing the contract, the monopolist manufacturer can solve the start-
up problem efficiently, since he can count on CCP subsidies. At the end of the game, he 
has to remunerate CCP according with their investment. This situation is shown in 
Fig.11. 
 
Fig.11 Timeline of Adoption dynamics with CCP subsidies and complete contracts 
If        and     
         , thus only “network related” subsidies are pivotal the 
problem for the manufacturer becomes: 
(65)                 
            or            ∫          
    
  
 
115 
 
If        and        , thus both “device related” and “network related” subsidies 
can be pivotal the problem for the manufacturer becomes: 
   
 
[       
                           ] 
              ∫          
    
  
 or       ∫          
    
  
 
 
Where the constraints represent the condition to solve the start-up problem with CCP 
subsidies or technologic subsidies. 
 
Proposition 10: If        and     
          or if        and        , 
establishing complete contracts can lead to a Pareto-superior equilibrium, with respect 
to the situation in which both firms act opportunistically 
Proof: If        and     
         , subsidies from CCP are a necessary condition 
to adoption from “non-geeks”. In this case complete contracts allow to end up in 
     
    thus consumers are better off. Moreover, manufacturer is better off since he 
does not provide subsidies and obtains             for the regularity assumption. 
CCP obtains zero profit in both cases but at      
 more firms enter the market. if 
       and        , then we can set two conditions: 
(66)                  
           
       and 
(67)     
          
Where the first term in (66) represents the additional costs if manufacturer provides 
“device related” subsidies while the second term is composed by the remuneration of 
CCP for their subsidies and delta profits with respect to the case in which the companies 
act separately. This condition, if respected, indicates that the manufacturer is better off 
coordinating with CCPs. Thus if only (66) holds, in the new equilibrium manufacturer 
and CCPs are better off but not consumers. On the other hand, if only (67) holds but not 
(66), then consumers are better off in the new equilibrium but manufacturer has an 
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incentive in not stipulating the contracts. Thus if the technology is such that (66) and 
(67) hold, then establishing complete contracts between manufacturer and CCP leads to 
a Pareto-superior equilibrium enhancing social welfare. 
The next section assume that manufacturer cannot commit on price and show that social 
welfare enhancing equilibria obtained above cannot be reached in the absence of 
complete contracts. 
ii. Timeline with incomplete contracts 
 
Fig.12 Timeline of Adoption dynamics with CCP subsidies and incomplete contracts 
 
Proposition 11: If        and     
         , and complete contracts are not 
available, the Pareto-superior equilibrium depicted in the previous section cannot be 
attained. The risk of opportunistic behaviour leads to a suboptimal equilibrium. 
Proof:  We assume the same conditions as the previous section but this time we allow 
the manufacturer to change price of the device before non-geeks decide on adoption on 
   . In this case, in the absence of complete contracts, manufacturer has an incentive 
to initially set price   according to the preceding schema, so it is compatible with CCP 
subsidies. Then once        and   CCP have invested to enter and subsidized, 
manufacturer can raise the price   , obtaining higher profits. This will bring to the same 
equilibrium as before, since CCP have already suffered sunk cost and thus will prefer to 
adjust their price. At equilibrium we will have      and: 
(68)           
   
(69)               
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Anticipating this behavior, CCPs will not invest. Thus we will end up with a suboptimal 
equilibrium with a lower share of adopters   , and lower profits for the manufacturer as 
shown in table 1.  
CCP 
Manufacturer 
Investing Wait and see 
Keeping      (     
 )              (      )   
Changing                 (     
 )       
      
  (      )   
Table.1: Coordination problem with incomplete contracts 
If we drop the assumption that CCP are identical, we will also have a coordination 
problem in the CCP market. When the start-up problem is not solved, each company 
will have an incentive to wait and see, eventually free-riding on the investment of other 
Media companies, once          
Going back to our case study of Publishing companies and e-readers, we observe the 
following: investment from Publishers seem to increase consumers’ valuation of e-
readers and their associated network. Their cooperation may be pivotal for non-geeks to 
adopt this new technology. In order to invest in the new distribution network, Media 
companies need to be granted sufficient returns from their investment. Under current 
market conditions, publishing companies suffer considerable risks by investing in the 
new distribution networks: first of all, they suffer hold-up risk from manufacturers. In 
fact, each manufacturer has a dominant position and control distribution through his 
platform, thus can impact profitability of publishing companies in many ways. 
Moreover, they suffer a cannibalization risk on their traditional distribution network; 
this risk increases if they are forced to reduce prices in one distributive channel. Finally, 
if they subsidize the new network and there is free-entrance, they suffer a free-riding 
risk from other Media companies, which can wait and enter the market at a later stage 
without suffering the costs of subsidies. If complete contracts are available, the positive 
network externalities generated can be distributed efficiently to bring both sides of the 
market on-board and increase social welfare.  
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Conclusions 
 
In this paper we show that in a two-sided market with network externalities, cooperation 
of complementary contents producers can be pivotal to reach the critical mass of 
adopters needed to solve the start-up problem of a new technology. Moreover, in case of 
cooperation, under given conditions a Pareto-superior final equilibrium can be reached. 
Nevertheless, when the technology giving access to the network is proprietary, complete 
contracts with the producers of complementary contents might be necessary to reach 
this equilibrium. We also show that for some technologies, overinvesting to enhance 
technologic characteristics might be profit maximizing, even if only a few consumers 
are actually valuating positively these technologic innovations. In fact, those few 
customers can sometimes be essential to constitute an installed customers base large 
enough to solve the start-up problem. 
These results allow for a reflection over recent investigations U.S. Court vs. Apple Inc. 
and al. or EU Antitrust formal proceedings to investigate sales of e-books. The main 
claim of these investigations is that recent contracts established by a group of publishers 
with the leader of tablets’ manufacturer constitute a case of vertical restraint (they are 
basically MRP – minimum retail price – agreements). While MRP can be often 
considered as negative distortions, in the light of our analysis of the case of Tablets and 
Media, we could question whether these contracts are the main distortion in this 
emerging market or a consequence of current regulation and market structure. In fact, 
profitability of digitized versions sold through e-readers’ network is very low for 
publishers. On the one side, the actual diffusion of e-readers does not guarantee a 
sufficient market for complementary contents. On the other side, the margins for 
publisher are lower than in the physical distribution network. This may be counter-
intuitive since digitized versions are costless to reproduce. Nevertheless considering the 
lower willingness to pay of consumers, the unfavourable fiscal regimes (ex. VAT in 
France is 5% for physical books and 21% for digitized books), and the high distribution 
fees that publishers have to reverse to manufacturers (since they often act as distributors 
of digitized contents as well), the algebraic sum can be already negative. Moreover, 
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publishers need to consider the possible negative externalities introduced by the new 
distribution channel.  Overall, the cost of subsidizing early-adopters of the new network 
is being sustained by Media industry consistently. In order to recover for these costs, 
publishers would need to control their distribution channels strategically or at least 
establishing a complete contract with the digital distributors of their contents. 
Otherwise, they risk suffering negative profits, due to the dominant position of the 
manufacturer/distributors in this market and they will stop providing subsidies. If the 
intention of the regulator is to enhance competition and to favour universal access to 
new networks, maybe the first distortion to address should be the regulation of digital 
distributors, which has been acknowledge but not solved with the Block exemption 
regulation by EU, which allows for instance fashion brands to restraint distribution of 
their goods in order to prevent their strong investments in the brand from free-riding.   
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Chapter 3  
Pricing Copyrighted Contents in the Digital Era: The 
case of Magazines’ Industry   
 
Abstract 
 
This paper moves from the economic issues raised by digitization and by the roll-out of 
an innovative support such as Reading Tablets on Press Magazine’s market. By 
separating the concepts of meaningful expression from the traditional supports allowing 
for publishing, digitization imposes a rethinking of media industries’ business models 
and copyright frameworks. Each digital reader represents in fact a new medium 
allowing for the diffusion of copyrighted contents in digitized formats and their 
penetration rate will impact the share of the industry turnover that will be generated 
online and the cannibalization rate with respect to physical channels. This paper 
analyzes these issues through a pricing model for copyrighted contents in a two-sided 
market with multi-channel distribution. We analyze both the case of a firm producing 
only on one market (digital or physical) and of a firm producing the same content in 
different versions in the two markets. We find that: (i) in the digital market the “free 
dailies” business model is sustainable only if the number of publishers is limited. (ii) 
Publishers that are active already in the traditional channel with relevant market shares 
should “defend” their market share setting higher prices for the digital versions of their 
products. (iii) Unless both the advertising revenues per copy and the total sales in the 
digital markets grow larger than the traditional market, a traditional publisher should 
keep operating in the traditional market. (iv) If the total cannibalization grows to be 
more than proportional the optimal strategy for a publisher can be not to produce the 
digital version of a given product. 
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Introduction 
 
The economic issues raised by digitization of information goods have been largely 
studied by economists. Digitization (Shapiro 1998) of copyrighted goods have had a 
growing impact on Media industries since it allows for a much cheaper and faster 
circulation of contents, the main drawbacks being the cannibalization of traditional 
industries and the creation of new challenges for legal institutions such as massive 
piracy and Creative Commons. Varian, H. (1995) introduces the problem of pricing 
goods with heterogeneous evaluations and a cost structure with high fixed costs – or 
costs of the first copy – and negligible marginal costs. He shows how engaging in price 
discrimination and bundling techniques in these cases lead to a situation in which both 
the industry and consumers are better off. By differentiating the product the market can 
be segmented and revenues can be recovered also from user with low willingness to pay 
without destroying the value from segments of consumers with high-willingness. 
Deneckere and McAfee (1994) show that even the conscious use of product degradation 
can make all parties strictly better off under specific circumstances. In addition to 
differentiation, bundling is a price discrimination technique which is particularly 
important when dealing with information goods and experience goods (Nelson 1970), 
since a utility evaluation can be made only after the consumption of the good and the 
heterogeneity in evaluations can be important. Bundling consist in offering 
distinct products for sale as one package. Nalebuff, B. (1999) shows how this tool is 
effective in auto-sorting consumers into different groups according to their willingness 
to pay. Bundling could be effective, under specific circumstances, even if products are 
partial substitutes, as it is in the case of thematic channels in pay TV, or as it is likely to 
be the case with different versions of the same media
6
. The effectiveness of multi-form
7
 
bundling has been studied by Koukova, N., Kannan, P.K. and Ratchford, B. (2008). 
They show that complementarities exist between different formats and consumers tend 
to value them positively proportionally to the awareness they have about the differences 
between formats. Bakos and Brynjolfsson (2000) show that the optimal strategy for 
information goods (with low marginal cost) is pure bundling, while Venkatesh, R. and 
                                                             
6 See Gentzkow, M. (2005) on complementarities between physical and online newspapers 
7 A package composed of the same product declined in physical and digitized versions 
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Chatterjee (2006) have analyzed the magazine markets the magazine market finding that 
it is always profit-enhancing for publishers to offer digitized versions although the 
domain of optimality of pure bundling is more limited. 
Despite all these contributions showing the good opportunities brought by new media, 
publishing companies have been struggling to define their optimal pricing and 
marketing mixes in a context of increasing digitization. In the case of magazine 
publishing, the complexity of the profit maximization problem is substantially increased 
when digital versions are offered: the multiplication of substitutable versions and 
distribution channels sums up with the incertitude on the future evolution and on the 
competitive and legal framework of the digital market. The originality of the problem is 
that it combines a large number of economic issues which have hardly been tackled all 
together in one model. Magazine publishing is a two-sided market, since advertisers and 
consumers both concur to the sustainability of a publication business model. Magazines 
are differentiated goods, since they are subject to copyright but they compete for the 
leisure time of consumers. The digital market represent an opportunity to better 
discriminate between consumers, but producing a digitized version of the physical 
magazine means introducing a substitutable product in the market, thus cannibalization 
effects must be taken into consideration. Finally, digitized versions are produced at 
negligible marginal costs through a different retailing network, introducing multi-
channel distribution problem such as free-riding in the business model.  
For almost a decade, while the digital market was limited to PC as a support and to 
“free dailies business model, magazines’ publishers did not engage to much effort to 
enter the digital market, perceiving it as an unprofitable niche and a limited treat, 
especially due to the low compatibility of digital supports with the exploitation of 
magazines’ utility. Innovations such as smartphones and tablets have increased the 
utility of consumers for digitized written contents and attracted more advertising 
revenues in the market, making it more attractive for magazine publishers. Nevertheless, 
the optimal strategy to exploit digitization in the magazine industry has not yet been 
identified. The prevailing business models used by publishing brands to approach the 
digital market have been “free dailies”8 or “freemium”9 models, but are these models 
                                                             
8 Publishers using this model give acces to the contents for free, in order to maximize diffusion and consequent advertising revenues. 
9 Publishers using this model give limited access to their contents for free, to build brand loyalty and attract premium paying subscribers.  
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really sustainable in a context of increased competition and reduced historical market 
power? Moreover, the introduction on the market of new version with higher degrees of 
substitutability has increased the concerns about the future of the whole traditional 
value chain. 
The objective of this paper is to identify the optimal pricing strategy for an agent who is 
producing physical goods which can be offered also in digitized versions. The 
exploration of this complex question can be helpful to publishers and can be extended to 
other markets with similar characteristics in order to answer common questions such as: 
Under what product-market conditions would be profitable to offer a digital version of a 
product? How effective can versioning and bundling tools in a context of multi-channel 
distribution? Would digitization “kill” the traditional distribution channels in the long 
run?  
In order to answer these questions the paper analyzes, through a simplified model, the 
pricing problem of a publisher who is assumed to operate in monopolistic competition, 
selling a single differentiated (copyrighted) product which can be available to 
consumers in multiple versions (physical or digitized). First we specify the different 
sustainable business models in the publishing industry. Then we show that the “free 
dailies” is hardly sustainable as the offer on the digital market grows and if a publisher 
has a positive pricing model in the traditional market. Moreover, we find out that 
traditional publishers with relevant shares of the market should try to defend the value 
of their product by applying a higher positive price when they enter the digital market. 
Finally, we analyze the market conditions that will eventually lead to a complete 
cannibalization of the traditional market.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: the next section introduces the 
standard model of publisher in the traditional physical market. Then we set some 
hypotheses about the digital market and we define the model of a publisher producing a 
digital differentiated product. In the fourth section, we establish a link between the 
markets to study the pricing strategy of a magazine publisher producing both a paper 
and a digitized version of his product. Section five concludes outlining the results of our 
model and tackling the related policy issues as well as future research developments. 
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A traditional economic model for publishing firms  
 
The magazines’ market has been traditionally characterized by a large number of small 
firms and few companies holding large portfolios of brands summing up to relevant 
market shares. The market is traditionally considered as concentrated in the top tier and 
more competitive in the lower tiers. A publisher is a firm selling edited pieces of 
information under a brand or a portfolio of brands. Each brand identifies a product 
referred as a magazine, which is assumed to be differentiated from the other goods in 
the market. The hypothesis that magazines are differentiated despite the fact that they 
often rely on the same sources of information, is based on two elements: first of all 
magazines are bundles of copyrighted contents, which by definition cannot be replicated 
exactly without incurring in a violation of intellectual property. The second element is 
the brand, which is common differentiating tool discussed in previous literature. 
We assume that the physical global market is composed of   firms indexed by   
      each producing, for simplicity, a single differentiated good. We also assume that 
the consumer’s market is composed of a mass of consumers denotes S with a strictly 
quasi-concave utility function. Each firm j starts with a given endowment derived from 
past investment in differentiation, which is represented by her initial share of the global 
market and is denoted   ̅. We further assume that the firm faces a down-sloping demand 
that depends on the deviation from the algebraic mean of the vector of magazines’ 
prices available in the market, which is denoted  ̅ . This parameter is assumed to be 
exogenous when the firm takes her pricing decision, thus firm j can disregard the effect 
of their single magazine pricing strategy on the actions of their competitors in the short 
term. The demand for the firm can be written: 
(1)       (     ̅  ̅) 
Furthermore we can explicit this demand function assuming a linear relation and 
writing: 
 
(2)             ̅   (    ̅)  
128 
 
Normalizing the S mass of consumers to one we can simplify the demand faced by the 
publisher to: 
(3)           ̅   (    ̅) 
The cost function faced by the publisher is composed of a fixed part ( ) and a variable 
part (  ). The former represents all the costs which are needed to produce the first copy 
of a copyrighted content, such as authors’ wages, editors and support services provided 
by the publisher. The variable cost includes the production of each additional copy, 
transport and distribution cost. We can write: 
(4)                
The revenues of the publishers are composed by the selling price and by advertising 
revenues, which are a function of the diffusion of the magazine and are defined as 
follow: 
(5)            
In order to keep the model simple we can assume a linear form for the advertising 
revenues as we did for the demand function. The previous equation becomes then: 
(6)         ̅  T 
The problem for the firm is to set the non-negative price that maximizes his profit 
function in the paper market, which can be written: 
(7)                         
or explicitly 
(8)                                 
To solve the problem we can apply the first order condition for a monopolist that will 
simply read: 
(9)          
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(10) (  )  
  ̅    
 
  ̅ 
(11) 
        
   
 
  ̅     
 
  ̅ 
 
Using equation 3, 4 and 6, we can solve to find the optimal price for firm  .  
 
(12) 
  ̅     
 
  ̅   ̅     
(13)  
  
 ̅   ( ̅  ̅   )
 
 
(14)  
 {
                                          ̅  
 ̅ 
 
  ̅    
 ̅ 
  
 
 ̅  ̅   
 
                                
} 
The resulting profit is:  
(15)  
  (  
   ̅    )  (
 ̅   ( ̅  ̅   )
 
)    
(16)  
  
 
  
(  ̅     ̅   ̅     )
 
   
Analyzing this result in terms of the parameter   allows us to specify different 
categories of media goods in the publishing industry, corresponding to different 
business models. First of all, we can establish the necessary conditions for a publisher 
who relies exclusively on advertising revenues (i.e. free dailies). In fact if the coefficient 
of advertising revenues is sufficiently high, namely: 
(17) ̅  
 ̅ 
 
  ̅       
The strategy of setting      is optimal for firm . This strategy corresponds to 
maximizing diffusion of the goods to reach: 
(18)  
      ̅    ̅ 
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And a profit of: 
(19)   (  ̅    ̅)  ( ̅    )    
The other extreme case is when  ̅   , which is the case of products which cannot rely 
on advertising (i.e. can be the case for books, which usually do not include advertising 
pages). In this case we have the traditional monopoly solution which in this case reads: 
(20)  
  
 ̅   ( ̅   )
 
 
(21)  
  
 ̅ 
  
 
 ̅   
 
 
(22)   (
 ̅ 
  
 
 ̅   
 
)   (
 ̅   ( ̅   )
 
)  
 
  
(  ̅   ( ̅    ))
 
   
The above reasoning can be summarized as follows: 
Proposition 1: if the economy is composed by a single market for the differentiated 
good, under the hypotheses set above, we have that    
  [  
 ̅ 
  
 
 ̅   
 
]   . The optimal 
price   
  of a specific differentiated good depends on the coefficient  ̅  which can be 
interpreted as the relative weight of advertising revenues for firm  .  
Based on coefficient  ̅, we can identify three categories of products with different 
business models: 
 If  ̅  
 ̅ 
 
  ̅    , the firm’s strategy is to maximize diffusion, setting   
   . 
In the publishing industry this may represent the business model of free dailies, 
which rely exclusively on advertising revenues. 
 If    ̅  
 ̅ 
 
  ̅    , the firm’s strategy is to find the optimal balance between 
a good margin on kiosk sales and a sufficient diffusion to capture advertisers 
interest. This is the case of the majority of magazines and newspapers 
 If  ̅   , the firm’s strategy is to maximize profits from stall sales revenues. In 
publishing this represents the business model for books. 
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In this paragraph we have outlined that pricing strategy in the presence of linear 
advertising revenues, may vary consistently from one differentiated good to another. 
We have then identified three categories of products based on the relative weight of 
advertising revenues in the business model.  Moving from this setup, we will now 
assume that in addition to the physical market, there is the opportunity to exploit an 
emerging market, namely the digital market. Each publisher should decide whether to 
offer a digitized version and to establish a new pricing strategy for his good. In the next 
section we first discuss a number of hypotheses related to the new market and then we 
proceed to complete the pricing model for a publisher facing a new emerging market. 
 
Pricing differentiated goods in the digital market   
 
The advents of the internet, bit-encoding techniques and platform innovations such as 
the creation of smartphone and tablets have created new ways of conducting business in 
many fields of economy. In some industries such as in the media markets, digitization 
has brought a revolution in the business model of traditional firms. They allow for the 
creation of new products with specific cost functions and distribution channels and for 
the creation of new markets, characterized by specific competitive environments and 
regulations. On the supply side, digitization of press magazines relaxes the traditional 
constraints of the industry such as physical dimensions, costs of producing a copy and 
limitations to diffusion. The increased flexibility on the cost side in turn results in 
enhanced discrimination opportunities for the firms. On the drawbacks, the digital 
revolution complicates the pricing problem, introducing cannibalization and 
coordination problems among physical and digital value chains. 
In order to keep the model simple, we focus on the strategic pricing decisions of a single 
firm   producing two different versions of the same product: the traditional physical 
product and a digital version characterized by the same content but different support and 
format. In reality, we observe that the pricing decisions depend also on the interactions 
of each media firm with physical and digital distributors, which may have different 
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strategies, different competitive environments and different market power. In this paper 
we will disregard these interactions, leaving their treatment to a separate paper. 
In order to adapt the basic model to the digital context, that we generally identify with a 
subscript  , we need to introduce a number of hypotheses in addition to those discussed 
in the previous section. First of all, one of the positive impacts of digitization is the 
consistent reduction of the marginal cost of reproduction of copyrighted contents. For 
the sake of simplicity we will thus assume that marginal cost    is null when the unit of 
the good sold is in digital format. We use the notation        . On the other hand, 
producing and selling the additional product involves emerging costs    which are 
assumed to be fixed.  
(23)        
These costs include all the investment needed for the firm to conceive, produce and 
market the new product. This time we assume that the digital global market is composed 
of   potential firms indexed by         each producing, for simplicity, a single 
differentiated good. Some of these   firms are already active in the physical market 
while some others start operating exclusively in the digital market. Anyway we start by 
considering the markets as unrelated. We also assume that this time the consumer’s 
market is composed of a share  ̅ of the total mass of consumers S. This assumption 
derives from the fact that in order to have access to the digital version of a product   , a 
consumer needs to be equipped with a specific device. Coefficient  ̅ represents the 
percentage of the total population which is capable of accessing the digital market.  
Moreover we assume that in the new market each firm starts with a null endowment, 
meaning that market power derived from past investment in differentiation in the 
physical market is not automatically transferred in the digital market. Resuming we 
have that: 
(24)    ̅  
 ̅ 
 
           
Finally we keep the assumption that the firm faces a down-sloping demand and that 
there is free entry in the new market. The demand function for the firm depends on the 
number of firms entering the market and on price 
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(25)       (     ) 
We can explicit this demand function assuming a linear relation and writing: 
 
(26)   (     )    ̅ (
 
 
   (     ̅ )) 
 
Normalizing the S mass of consumers to one we can simplify the demand faced by the 
firm to: 
(27)   (     )   ̅ (
 
 
   (     ̅ )) 
The revenues of the publishers in the digital market are composed by the selling price 
and by advertising revenues as in the physical market: 
(28)              
Or explicitly: 
(29)         ̅    T 
We can now repeat the reasoning that we did for the physical market to find the price 
that maximizes the firm’s profit function in the digital market. The maximization 
problem can be written: 
(30)                               
The F.O.C. reads: 
(31) 
 
 
  
   
 ̅
  
  ̅   ̅    
 
 
Solving for     we obtain:  
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(32)   
  
 ̅
 
(
 
 
     ̅   ̅  ) 
(33)   
  {
                                          ̅  
 
   
  ̅ 
 
   
(
 
 
     ̅   ̅  )                                 
} 
And the resulting profit is  
(34)   
  
 
   
(
 
 
     ̅   ̅  )  
 ̅
 
(
 
 
     ̅   ̅  )      
(35)   
  
 ̅
   
(
 
 
     ̅   ̅  )
 
     
As we did for the physical market, we can establish the necessary conditions for a 
publisher who relies exclusively on advertising revenues (i.e. free web-sites). If 
(36) ̅  
 
   
  ̅    
It is optimal for publisher   to set      . The maximum share of the market that firm  
is able to reach is: 
(37)   
          ̅ (
 
 
    ̅ ) 
And the resulting profit is: 
(38)     ̅ (
 
 
    ̅ )  ̅      
On the other hand, when  ̅    or very close to zero, which could be the case of many 
digital publications such as websites or blogs in the start-up phase, the solution of the 
maximization problem gives:  
(39)   
  
 ̅
 
(
 
 
    ̅ ) 
(40)   
  
 
   
(
 
 
    ̅ ) 
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This gives us the range of optimal price for a digital differentiated product depending on 
his capability of generating advertising revenues.  
(41)   
   ̅   [  
 
 
(
 
   
  ̅ )] 
If we assume that this market is unrelated with the physical one, when the market starts 
we have no historic average price  ̅   , the   firms become then symmetric and at 
equilibrium they will all behave in the same way: 
(42)   (     )   ̅ (
 
 
      ) 
(43) (   )  
 
   
 
   
   
 
And we have that: 
(44)   
  
 ̅
 
(
 
 
    ̅ ) 
(45)     ̅  {
                                          ̅  
 
   
 
   
(
 
 
    ̅ )                                 
} 
Finally, since we have free entry in the market, we have either: 
 
(46)    
 ̅
 
  ̅        
From which we get:  
(47)   
 ̅ ̅ 
   
 
Or 
(48)    
 ̅
 
(
 
 
    ̅ )  
 
   
(
 
 
    ̅ )      
 ̅
   
 (
 
 
    ̅ )
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(49)      
  ̅   √
 
 ̅  
   ̅ 
   
 
 ̅
 
Finally if the firms in the market cannot rely on advertising, the equilibrium number of 
firms is given by: 
(50)   
  
 ̅
  
;    
  
 
    
 
(51)    
 ̅
  
 
 
    
       
(52)   
 
 
√
 ̅
     
 
 
Proposition 2: If the digital market is totally unrelated with the physical one, under the 
hypotheses set above, we have that     
  
[
 
 
 
 
  
 
√
 ̅  
   ]
 
 
 
 
   . The optimal price    
  of a 
specific differentiated good depends on the coefficient  ̅   and it is common to every 
firm   [    ]. If 
 If  ̅  
 
   
 the optimal strategy for every firm is to maximize diffusion, 
setting    
   . If the advertising revenues are sufficiently attractive, since 
there are no marginal costs and no historical average price, every firm that can 
enter in the market has an incentive to maximize diffusion. 
  If    ̅  
 
   
, the firms strategy is to charge the share of the average cost of 
production that is not covered by advertising.  
Proposition 3: as   , (i.e. the available offer of contents grows infinitely large) the 
strategy of offering digital products for free is not sustainable for any firm   operating 
only in the digital market, if investment are needed for the production of the 
differentiated product (i.e.      .  The maximum number of firms that could operate 
in the market with the strategy    
    is we can solve 43 for , imposing  ̅    : 
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(53)   
 ̅ ̅ 
   
 
This number increases with the diffusion of digital market and advertising revenues and 
decreases with the costs needed to set up the differentiated product. 
 
Pricing differentiated goods available in substitutable versions 
The introduction of digitized versions allows for increased versioning and bundling 
opportunities for those firms already active in the physical market. The same written 
content, thanks to bit-encoding techniques, can be offered to consumers in many more 
ways: through a website, in Portable Document Format
10
, through smartphone and 
tablets specific application, through content aggregators or social networks, etc. 
Moreover, different versions can be digitally combined (bundled) in virtually infinite 
ways, thanks to the relaxation of physical constraints. In fact, the traditional bundles 
offered in the publishing industry, subscriptions (bundle of editions) and bundle of titles 
can be significantly expanded while a new bundling option, the coupling of different 
versions of the same contents, emerge.  
Nevertheless, a digitized version is a substitute product for the hardcopy sharing the 
same contents; we may argue about the degree of substitutability of digital versions not 
being perfect, but overall the economic literature has shown a clear cannibalization 
effect between physical and digital copies of the same product. To model this effect we 
introduce in the traditional model introduced in section 1, an exogenous parameter  ̅ 
which we assume as representative of the reduction of physical sales due to 
cannibalization effect of new market. If a firm   decides to sell a digital version of her 
physical product, the quantity of physical goods sold will thus depend also on the 
quantity of digital units of the goods that are sold. 
(54)  
     (       ) 
The relation between digital sales and physical sales is once again assumed to be linear 
for simplicity, we can thus write: 
                                                             
10 Commonly called PDF, it is a digitized fac-simile of a document 
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(55)  
 (   )    (  ̅   (    ̅))   ̅   
  
The total demand faced by a firm   in the two markets can be written 
(56)  
   (       )    (  ̅   (    ̅))      ̅  ̅ (
 
 
   (     ̅ )) 
The total cost function for a firm   which is selling both physical and digital version of 
his product becomes: 
(57)  
   (      )         
    
 
Where              is the sum of the investment needed to operate in the two 
markets? For simplicity, we assume that each firm can produce a single digital version 
of her differentiated physical good. If a firm is already active in the physical market, he 
can use his market power and the extra profits in the physical market to develop the 
digital one. We will also assume that firm   has total control of both his traditional and 
his digital retailing network. This hypothesis limits our model to a particular model of 
digital distribution, which may not be suitable for all firms. In reality, firms going 
digital have a number of available strategies, each of which involves complex economic 
tradeoffs which deserve an in depth discussion which is not in the purpose of this paper.  
We can thus proceed solving the maximization problem as we did in the previous 
sections. First of all we normalize the S mass of consumers to one we can simplify the 
demand faced by the firm to: 
(58)  
   (       )    (      )     (   ) 
(59)   (       )  (  ̅   (    ̅))   ̅   (   ) 
(60)   (   )= ̅ (
 
 
   (     ̅ )) 
The total revenues from the advertising sector will be the sum of the two incomes:  
(61)     
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Or explicitly: 
(62)  
             ̅     ̅    T 
Since advertising rates depends on the potential audience and on the actual sales, we can 
further simplify by assuming that the coefficient  ̅ is a good proxy of the relative value 
of  ̅ with respect to  ̅, so that  
(63)    ̅   ̅ ̅ 
Holds and we can write: 
(64)  
   (      )   ̅(    ̅   ) 
Moreover, if the traditional publishing firms enter the digital market, they will introduce 
in the market their historical average price, which will participate in forming ̅ , so in 
this case  ̅   . We could assume for example that  ̅  would depend positively on the 
historical average price  ̅ and on the share of firms that are active in both markets   
 
 
,  so  ̅ ( ̅ 
 
 
). 
The problem for the firm is to set the couple of prices that maximizes his global profit 
function. The maximization problem can be written: 
(65)               
                     
      
      
or explicitly 
(66)                  (      )                 
            
  
   (      ) 
To solve the problem we need to apply the first order conditions that read: 
(67)         
             
   
 
          
   
 
          
   
 
This is the standard condition for the physical market, and 
(68)          
               
    
 
       
    
 
  (   )
    
  
   (     )  
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This condition implies that the marginal profit obtained by producing one unit of digital 
output should equalize the marginal cost of cannibalization in the physical market. We 
first solve for the first condition to find: 
(69)  (      )  
  ̅      ̅   
 
  ̅ 
(70) 
             
   
 
  ̅       ̅   
 
  ̅ 
 
(71) 
          
   
  ̅ 
 
(72) 
          
   
    
 
(73) 
  ̅       ̅   
 
  ̅   ̅     
 
(74)  
  
 ̅   ( ̅  ̅   )  ̅   
 
 
 
 
From the second condition we get: 
(75)   (   )  
 
   
  ̅  
   
 ̅  
 
(76) 
            
    
 
 
   
  ̅  
    
 ̅  
 
(77) 
             
    
 
  ̅  
 
 
(78) 
          
    
  ̅ ̅ 
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(79) 
          
   
   
 
(80) 
 
   
  ̅  
    
 ̅  
  ̅ ̅   ̅
   
 
 
 
Solving 80 for     we have: 
 
(81)   
  
  ̅
 
[
 
 
   ( ̅   ̅ ̅   ̅
  
 
)] 
(82)   
  
 
   
[
 
 
   ( ̅   ̅ ̅   ̅
  
 
)] 
Substituting 81 in 74 we can find the expression for   
  and   
  : 
(83)  
   
 
(  
 ̅   ̅  
  
)
[  ̅   ( ̅   ̅    )  
 ̅ ̅
 
[
 
 
   ( ̅   ̅ ̅)]] 
(84)  
   (
 ̅ 
 
  ̅)  
    ̅  ̅
   
  
   
 ̅ ̅
  
[
 
 
   ( ̅   ̅ ̅)] 
And by calling: 
(85) 
    ̅  ̅
  ( ̅   ̅     )
  ̈ 
(86)  
   (
 
 
  ̈)(  ̅    ̅  (
 ̅ ̅
 
[
 
 
   ( ̅   ̅ ̅)]))   ̈ ( ̅    )
̈  
To get an understanding of the economic implications we observe the variation of prices 
as the digital market develops and as the cannibalization effect increases. First of all 
let’s analyze the start-up phase of the new market, in which  ̅  [   ] and  ̅   [   ]. 
If  ̅    or  ̅   , we have    
 
  
̈
  and we get back to the results of the initial 
situation in which either the only existing market is the traditional one ( ̅   ) or the 
products are non-substitutable and the markets are independent ( ̅    . On the other 
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hand, if both  ̅   , meaning that the digital market has reached the same level of 
development (i.e. same global demand) and produces the same advertising revenues 
and  ̅   , so the products are perfect substitutes, we have that: 
(87)   
  
  
 
[
 
 
   ( ̅   ̅  
  
 
)] 
(88)   
  
 
   
[
 
 
   ( ̅   ̅  
  
 
)] 
(89)  
   
 
(  
  
  
)
[  ̅   ( ̅   ̅    )  
 
 
[
 
 
     ̅   ̅ ]] 
(90)  
   
(  
  
  
)
(  
  
  
)
(
 ̅ 
 
  ̅)  
 
(  
  
  
)
( ̅    )  
(
  
  
  )
(  
  
  
)
 
  
[
 
 
   ( ̅    )] 
To complete the analysis we can now look at two other extreme cases. The first case is 
the case of a completely developed digital market ( ̅   ) with no cannibalization 
( ̅    . This would be of course a first best solution for the firm, which would be able 
to exploit the segmentation of the markets. The optimal strategy in this case will be: 
(91)     
  
 
 
[
 
 
     ̅   ̅ ] 
(92)   
  
 
   
[
 
 
     ̅   ̅ ] 
(93)  
   
 
 
[  ̅   ( ̅   ̅    )] 
(94)  
   
 
  
[  ̅     ̅   ̅     ] 
The last extreme case is when the digital market is not yet developed ( ̅   ) and the 
products are substitutable. In this case the solution is very simple since there will be no 
production in the digital market and the production in the physical market does not vary.  
(95)   
    
(96)   
  
 
   
[
 
 
     ̅   ̅ ] 
(97)  
   
 
 
[  ̅   ( ̅   ̅    )] 
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(98)  
   
 
  
[  ̅     ̅   ̅     ] 
From these equations we can set the following results. 
Proposition 3: in a context in which a firm operates in two equally fully developed 
markets (same S and  ̅  and  ̅     ) with different structure and substitutability 
between the products, and the firm is free to set his pricing policy, the optimal price for 
the new version is in the range: 
(99)   
  [
 
 
(
 
   
  ̅   ̅)  
 
   
[
 
 
     ̅   ̅ ]  
 
       
[  ̅   ( ̅   ̅  
  )   
 
 
[
 
 
     ̅   ̅ ]]]  ̅  [   ] 
Depending on the cannibalization rate among the two distribution channels. As the 
degree of substitutability grows ( ̅   ), the optimal pricing strategy for the digital 
version depends positively on the share of the physical market and negatively on 
marginal costs. These effects are amplified if the price elasticity in the digital market is 
higher than in the traditional market (        As an example, if     , we have that: 
(100)     
  [
 
 
(
 
   
  ̅   ̅)  
 
   
(
 
 
    ̅ )  
 
   
 ̅  
 
   
[ ̅  
  ( ̅   ̅    )]]   ̅  [   ] 
if      , we obtain  
(101)     
  [
 
 
(
 
   
  ̅   ̅)  
 
  
[ ̅   ( ̅   ̅    )]  
 
  
 ̅]   ̅  [   ] 
 
The result that the higher is the marginal cost of producing the traditional good the 
higher should be the differential with the digital good is straightforward. The other 
results deserve some reflections. The intuition is that a firm with a high share of the 
market in the traditional market has an incentive to protect that market, relatively to a 
firm with an irrelevant share, which has an incentive to maximize his diffusion in the 
new market. Both effects become more important if the cannibalization between the two 
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products is higher. This effect is then mitigated or increased by the differential in price 
elasticity in the two markets. 
Let’s analyze now the cases in which the new market exceeds the size of the traditional 
one  ̅  [   ]or the cannibalization effect is more than proportional  ̅  [   ], or 
both these effects combined. 
 Case  ̅  [   ]and ( ̅     
Proposition 4: In case of perfect substitutability, the conditions for a complete 
cannibalization of the traditional market are: 
(102)  ̅  
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    ̅ ) √
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[ ̅   ( ̅  ̅   )]
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And 
(103)  ̅  
  
  
 
Or 
(104)  ̅  
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    ̅
 
[ ̅   ( ̅  ̅   )]
    ̅
 
 
And 
(105)  ̅  
  
  
 
 
If these conditions are respected, then the optimal strategy is to shut down the 
traditional market and concentrate on the digital one. Once again, these conditions are 
harder to be verified if the historical share of the market of the firm is higher. 
Proof: From 83 we have that: 
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(106)   
   
 
(  
 ̅  
  
)
[  ̅   ( ̅   ̅    )  
 ̅
 
[
 
 
   ( ̅   ̅ ̅)]] 
We can calculate the level of development of the digital market that becomes 
incompatible with the production of traditional products for a firm that operates in both 
markets (i.e. recall that we assume perfect substitutability in this case) 
  
           
(107)   ̅ (
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)    ̅ [
 
 
(
 
 
    ̅ )]   [  ̅   ( ̅   ̅    )]    
Which solves for:  
(108)  ̅    
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[ ̅   ( ̅  ̅   )]
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Since the     for this equation there are two real and distinct solutions. Moreover 
since  ̅    , we are interested only in the positive solution: 
(109)  ̅  
 
 
(
 
 
    ̅ ) √
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[  ̅  ( ̅  ̅   )]
    ̅
 
 
Moreover, we have to check for the domain of  ̅  From 102 we have that   
  is well 
defined for  ̅     
  
  
 , moreover if  ̅  
  
  
 and 104 hold, or if  ̅  
  
  
 and 102 holds, 
then we have    
    , so we can define the conditions for which a firm should shut 
down the traditional market and start operating only in the digital market. 
 
 Case  ̅  [   ]and ( ̅     
Proposition 5: If the markets are equally developed and for a given firm we have that 
the level of cannibalization grows to reach: 
(110)  ̅  
  (
 
   
  ̅   ̅)
 ̅   ( ̅  ̅   )
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then the optimal strategy for the firm is not to produce the digital version of the product. 
Proof: From the F.O.C. (80) we have that: 
(111) 
 
   
  ̅  
    
  
  ̅   ̅
   
 
 
So if the cannibalization effect is more than proportional, producing the digital version 
becomes less attractive for a firm which is already active in the traditional market. We 
can thus find the condition for which, even if the digital market is fully developed, it is 
not convenient to produce a digital substitute. 
(112)  ̅  
 
  
(
 
   
  ̅   ̅) 
Substituting for   we have:  
(113)  ̅  
  (
 
   
  ̅   ̅)
 ̅   ( ̅  ̅   )
 
If the cannibalization effect is more than proportional, even if the digital market is 
developed, a firm’s optimal solution could be not to produce the digital version of his 
physical differentiated good. This can be the case for example if the cannibalization of 
advertising revenues is more than proportional due to free-riding in the digital value 
chain (i.e. news aggregators extracting value from digital versions of copyrighted 
products) or if the presence of a digital version on the market generates increasing 
copyright infringements through circulation of pirated copies that do not generate any 
revenue for the firm but still contribute to cannibalize physical sales. 
 Case  ̅  [   ]and  ̅  [   ] 
Proposition 6: If the development of the digital market is very large but at the same 
time the cannibalization grows more than proportionally, the effect on the traditional 
distributive channel is undetermined.  
Proof: Taking the limit from the general expression, we see that the results is an 
undetermined formula. 
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 ̅   ̅  
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[  ̅   ( ̅   ̅    )  
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   ( ̅   ̅ ̅)]] 
(115)            
   
  
  
=undetermined 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have studied the pricing issues raised by the development of a digital 
market in the magazine publishing industry. The originality of the problem is that it 
combines a large number of economic issues which have hardly been tackled all 
together in one model. Magazine publishing is a two-sided market, since advertisers and 
consumers both concur to the sustainability of a publication business model. Magazines 
are differentiated goods, since they are subject to copyright but they compete for the 
leisure time of consumers. The digital market represent an opportunity to better 
discriminate between consumers, but producing a digitized version of the physical 
magazine means introducing a substitutable product in the market, thus cannibalization 
effects must be taken into consideration. Finally, digitized versions are produced at 
negligible marginal costs through a different retailing network, introducing multi-
channel distribution problem such as free-riding in the business model.  
We have thus studied the pricing problems for publishers operating in one single market 
and for publishers operating in both the traditional and the digital market. We set up a 
simple model based on the hypothesis that while traditional market has a history due to 
the investments of different publishing brands, the firms that start their activity in the 
digital market face the same market conditions. Among the results, we find that in the 
digital market the “free dailies” business model is sustainable only if the number of 
publishers is limited. Moreover, we find that publishers that are active in the traditional 
channel with relevant market shares should “defend” their market share by setting 
higher prices for the digital versions of their products, in order not to devaluate them 
and to reduce cannibalization between the two markets. On the other hand, publishers 
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which starts operating directly in the digital market or publishers with irrelevant market 
shares may have an interest in offering their products for free to maximize their 
diffusion and their share of advertising revenues. As for the general market trends, we 
find that unless both the advertising revenues per copy and the total sales in the digital 
markets grow larger than the traditional market, a traditional publisher should keep 
operating in the traditional market. In addition, if the total cannibalization grows to be 
more than proportional, namely if for each digital copy sold we lose more than one in 
the traditional market due to substitutability and copyright infringements, then the 
optimal strategy for a publisher can be not to produce the digital version of a given 
product. In this case, the publisher could choose a digital strategy with less negative 
externalities such as marketing a new digital product or a multi-support bundle. 
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